# DA---Defense Security Cooperation Agency Tradeoff---FMPS

## Topicality

### T-DSCA---1NC

#### A---Interpretation---the aff must go through the Defense Security Cooperation Agency---security cooperation is very broad, but so is the DSCA’s jurisdiction---prefer our evidence, it takes into account recent legal changes, has intent to define, and reconciles the DOD/DOS question

---not just descriptive of DOD security cooperation. It’s about security cooperation as a topic of interest within Congress generally, describes broader legislative authorities titled “security cooperation”, explicitly includes and accounts for DOS authority, explains the origins of the term “security cooperation” as being rooted in the creation of the Defense Security Cooperation Agency, and is descriptive of all security cooperation that takes place in a country as falling within the DSCA’s purview

Colonel Luisa Santiago et al 19, Captain Harry Parent, Captain Reed Lorch, Major Deidre Baker, Lieutenant Colonel Timothy Litka, Colonel Luisa Santiago, U.S. Army Reserve Command staff judge advocate; Colonel Anthony Adolph, General Counsel (Staff Judge Advocate) - United States Forces Korea; and Colonel William Smoot, Chief, Criminal Law Division, U.S. Army OTJAG. FEATURE: No. 3 Fostering Enduring Partnerships: An Overview of Security Cooperation Offices Through the Lens of Iraq, 2019 Army Law. 49, Nexis //pipk

Security cooperation (SC) is clearly a topic of current interest to Congress and the Defense community. In recent years, several changes to the regulatory and statutory guidance have taken place that include the publication of a RAND Report reviewing Title 10 authorities for security cooperation in 2016, 2 issuance of revisions to at least seven key joint references in 2017, 3 the publication of a Government Accountability Office (GAO) Report on Building Partner Capacity in March 2017, 4 the designation of a new chapter under Title 10--Chapter 16 Security Cooperation--and the push to professionalize and develop the security cooperation workforce under the newly formed Department of Defense Security Cooperation Workforce Development Program (SCWD) within the Fiscal Year (FY) 2017 National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA). 5

Provided through the lens of the largest current Security Cooperation Office (SCO)--the Office of Security Cooperation - Iraq (OSC-I)--this article is meant to serve as a primer for judge advocates facing assignment to an SCO, as well as judge advocates who may have an SCO in their geographic area.

What Is Security Assistance, What Is Security Cooperation, and Who Does What?

While the term "security assistance" (SA) has been in frequent use in the Department of Defense (DoD) since at least 1971, 6 the term "security cooperation" was first introduced by the Defense Reform Initiative in 1997. 7 The Defense Reform Initiative led to the Defense Security Assistance Agency (DSAA) being renamed the Defense Security Cooperation Agency (DSCA), effective 1 October 1998, 8 to reflect the enlarged mission and additional international programs DSCA would go on to administer. These programs are carried out by SCOs and DoD Regional Centers for Security Studies. 9 Explanation and definitions of SA and SC are provided herein, followed by more information on SCOs and DoD Centers for Security Studies.

[\*50] Security Assistance

Security assistance primarily encompasses foreign military financing and sales, military education and training, peacekeeping, and counter-narcotics efforts. 10 Department of Defense Directive (DoDD) 5132.03, reissued on 29 December 2016, defines SA in conformity with the underlying U.S. Code provision, and specifies that SA is one element within the broader category of SC:

Security Assistance. Group of programs authorized by the Foreign Assistance Act [(FAA)] of 1961 and the Arms Export Control Act [(AECA)] of 1976 or other related statutes by which the United States provides defense articles, military training, and other defense-related services by grant, loan, credit, or cash sales in furtherance of national policies and objectives. Security assistance is one element of security cooperation, which is funded and authorized by the Department of State and administered by the DSCA.

This definition received additional minor modifications in the 23 May 2017, Joint Publication 3-20, Security Cooperation. 11 The only substantive modifications were adding "lease" to the methods of providing defense articles, changing that assistance is authorized "through" Department of State rather than "by" Department of State, and adding DoD as administering in conjunction with DSCA. 12 The most substantive update contained within both DoDD 5132.03 and Joint Publication 3-20 is the recognition that security assistance is one element of security cooperation.

Security Cooperation

While this term was the product of the 1997 Defense Reform Initiative, 13 and entered the DoD lexicon with the renaming of DSAA to DSCA in October 1998, 14 security cooperation remained ill-defined until 9 June 2004, when it was first formally defined within Joint Publication 1-02:

All DoD interactions with foreign defense establishments to build defense relationships that promote specific U.S. security interests, develop allied and friendly military capabilities for self-defense and multinational operations, and provide U.S. forces with peacetime and contingency access to a host nation. 15

That broad definition has continued to take shape, with 10 U.S.C. Ch. 16 § 301 currently defining security cooperation programs and activities of the DoD as meaning any program, activity (including an exercise), or interaction of the DoD with the security establishment of a foreign country to achieve a purpose as follows: build and develop allied and friendly security capabilities for self-defense and multinational operations; to provide the armed forces with access to the foreign country during peacetime or a contingency operation; to build relationships that promote specific U.S. security interests. 16

Department of Defense Directive 5132.03, reissued on 29 December 2016, includes a definition of SC in conformity with the underlying U.S. Code provision, and, like the current definition for SA, specifies that SA is included within SC:

Security Cooperation. All DoD interactions with foreign defense establishments to build defense relationships that promote specific U.S. security interests, develop allied and partner nation military and security capabilities for self-defense and multinational operations, and provide U.S. forces with peacetime and contingency access to allied and partner nations. This also includes DoD-administered security assistance programs.

This definition received an additional minor modification in the 23 May 2017, Joint Publication 3-20, Security Cooperation, replacing the word "defense" relationships with "security" relationships.

Defense Security Assistance Agency, Security Cooperation Offices, and Regional Centers for Security Studies

The DSCA's mission is to lead the Security Cooperation Community (SCC) in developing and executing innovative security cooperation solutions that support mutual U.S. and partner interests. 17 This mission is executed through SCOs, which bring together DoD security cooperation and DoS security assistance efforts, as well as DoD Regional Centers for Security Studies which act as venues for international discussion and course work teaching security cooperation. While DSCA falls under the DoD and is thus a Title 10 entity, it draws its authorities to establish and operate SCOs from Title 22 under the DoS, a structure which indicates Congress's desire that DoD and DoS synchronize security cooperation efforts.

Security Cooperation Offices are authorized by section 515 of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961. 18 Through that provision, Congress authorized the President to assign members of the Armed Forces of the United States to a foreign country to carry out the President's duties under the FAA and AECA to perform one or more of seven enumerated functions: (1) equipment and services case management; (2) training management; (3) program monitoring; (4) evaluation and planning of the host government's military capabilities and requirements; (5) administrative support; (6) promoting rationalization, standardization, interoperability, and other defense cooperation measures; and (7) liaison functions exclusive of advisory and training assistance.

Notably, advisory and training assistance is limited under 22 U.S.C. § 2321i(b):

Advisory and training assistance conducted by military personnel assigned under this section shall be kept to an absolute minimum. It is the sense of the Congress that advising and training assistance in countries to which military personnel are assigned under this section shall be provided primarily by other personnel who are not assigned under this section and who are detailed for limited periods to perform specific tasks.

Security Cooperation Organization is defined in DoDI 5132.13 as:

All DoD elements located in a foreign country with assigned responsibilities for carrying out security cooperation/assistance [\*51] management functions. It includes military assistance advisory groups, military missions and groups, offices of defense and military cooperation, liaison groups, and defense attaché personnel designated to perform security cooperation/assistance functions. 19

Security Cooperation Offices go by different names, with different mission sets, in different countries. Examples, in addition to the Office of Security Cooperation - Iraq, are the United States Military Training Mission (USMTM) in Saudi Arabia; 20 the Office of Military Cooperation - Egypt; 21 Office of Defense Cooperation - India; 22 and Office of Defense Representative - Pakistan. 23 . While each of these organizations carries a different name, they all perform an SA mission involving Foreign Military Sales and International Military Education and Training, and all play a role in security cooperation efforts such as training exercises.

#### B---Violation---we’ll concede a genuine we meet or this will be the 2NR

#### C---Standards

#### Limits---Security cooperation is vague and broad. Requiring the aff go through the DSCA is the only limit on the topic

#### Ground---there’s no core ground with link uniqueness against security cooperation broadly. DSCA is the only core disad. Smart plan wordings mean CP’s that PIC out of the DSCA lose to perms which means it’s only a question of disad ground.

### Yes DSCA---2NC

#### The aff must go through DSCA. It’s the only limit on the topic and is normal means for all security cooperation.

Anthony V. Lenze 17, Major, Judge Advocate, United States Army. Presently assigned as Associate Professor, Contract and Fiscal Law Department, The Judge Advocate General's Legal Center and School, United States Army, Charlottesville, Virginia. ARTICLE: TRADITIONAL COMBATANT COMMANDER ACTIVITIES: ACKNOWLEDGING AND ANALYZING COMBATANT COMMANDERS' AUTHORITY TO INTERACT WITH FOREIGN MILITARIES, 225 Mil. L. Rev. 641. Nexis //pipk

Security cooperation is now a term that encompasses "any program, activity (including an exercise), or interaction of the [DoD] with the security establishment of a foreign country to achieve a [strategic] purpose . . . [.]" 85 [85 10 U.S.C. § 301(7) (2017). Congress articulates three purposes for security cooperation: "to build and develop allied and friendly security capabilities for self-defense and multinational operations; to provide the armed forces with access to the foreign country during peacetime or a contingency operation; to build relationships that promote specific United States security interests. Id.] The DoD assigns such strategic importance to security cooperation that, with the help of Congress, it created the Defense Security Cooperation Agency (DSCA) to direct and guide the execution of all DoD security cooperation programs. 86 [86 U.S. GOV'T ACCOUNTABILITY OFF., GAO-13-84, SECURITY ASSISTANCE: DOD'S ONGOING REFORMS ADDRESS SOME CHALLENGES, BUT ADDITIONAL INFORMATION IS NEEDED TO FURTHER ENHANCE PROGRAM MANAGEMENT 4 (2012) (The "[Defense Security Cooperation Agency (DSCA)] oversees program administration for both traditional programs and newer [building partner capacity] programs. [The] DSCA establishes security assistance procedures and systems, provides training, and guides the activities of implementing agencies."). ] The DSCA helps administer security cooperation, now a multi-billion dollar industry within the annual Defense appropriation. 87 With all the money and strategic brainpower pouring into security cooperation, newcomers to the field may presume fully-vetted, standardized terms and definitions. However, this could not be further [\*656] from reality.

Members of the DoD frequently mischaracterize security cooperation or outright disagree with respect to its doctrinal definition. 88 For example, the 2010 National Security Strategy (NSS) used the term security cooperation to include rebuilding damaged infrastructure and establishing conditions necessary to end military operations in Afghanistan. 89 With the exception of combat operations, it would seem that almost any military action could fit under the 2010 NSS's version of security cooperation. 90 Nevertheless, if security cooperation is in fact an evolving term in the DoD, making sense of the authorities under which the military executes security cooperation events is even more troublesome. 91 This is especially true when authorities are based upon a set of specific terms. Hence, with doctrine lagging behind and accompanied by undefined terminology, no authority in the realm of security cooperation is more ambiguous than the authority for military-to-military contacts. 92 With ambiguity surrounding military-to-military contacts, planners and lawyers should defer to commanders to decide the best way to employ these strategic interaction events. The fate of 10 U.S.C. § 168 and its ultimate repeal is illustrative of this point.

### Overview---2NC

Security cooperation must go through the Defense Security Cooperation Agency. Setting a predictable requirement for one component of the aff mechanism is key to neg ground. Our arg isn’t that they can only fiat the DSCA, just that they must include the DSCA.

Our interpretation has an intent to define, has jurisdictional expertise, and traces the history of the term to explain why there’s so much confusion---it resolves DOD/DOS confusion because the DSCA operates under both---the term “security cooperation” didn’t exist until the DSCA was created in 1998---recent legal changes mean there is a lot of confusion around the term but it’s very broad, which a. means the scope of possible actions the aff can do is very large, which makes being neg hard, but b. also means the scope of actions that fall within the DSCA’s jurisdiction is large and includes the af

## Disad

### DSCA Disad---1NC

#### The Defense Security Cooperation Agency is stream-lining now to get weapons to Ukraine but they’re on the brink of being over-stretched by new demands from NATO and the rest of the world. Now is the critical time to lock-in security relationships but reliability is key.

Joe Gould 6/30, "Senior Pentagon reporter for Defense News, covering the intersection of national security policy, politics and the defense industry." <https://www.defensenews.com/pentagon/2022/06/30/european-arms-demand-grows-as-russia-fallout-deepens/> //pipk

The changed security environment in Europe will mean increased demand from its allies for integrated missile defenses, early warning systems, air-to-air missiles and intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance platforms, a senior U.S. defense official said Thursday.

The assessment comes as rattled European countries are committing to boost their militaries in the wake of Russia’s invasion of Ukraine. U.S. government officials, while racing to send weapons to Ukraine, are also working to backfill allies who have sent arms to Ukraine or are keen to strengthen their conventional defenses.

“Globally, that demand is increasing, and I do think we will continue to explore with our partners how they want to look at that,” Jed Royal, the deputy director of the Defense Security Cooperation Agency, said during a call with reporters. He said needs vary by country.

While the State Department has primary responsibility for approving arms exports, the DSCA, a Pentagon agency central to foreign military sales, has taken a key role in U.S. and allied efforts to send and replace billions of dollars worth of weapons both from existing military supplies and through new procurements.

“DSCA wants to make sure we are not only thinking in terms of backfilling the United States but certainly backfill[ing] for allies and partners as they continue to support Ukraine as well,” Royal said. “I spend a lot of time with our allies and partners and ... the demand is certainly coming in a really significant way.”

Potentially driving demand, NATO announced this week it plans to increase the size of its rapid reaction force from 40,000 to 300,000 troops by next year. Forces would be based in their home countries but deploy further east, where the alliance would stockpile equipment and ammunition.

Beyond air defenses, the focus of Europe’s defense investments should shift toward networks, strike weapons and munitions, logistics and base construction, Capital Alpha Partners Managing Director Byron Callan said in a note to investors Thursday.

“Open questions remain about how the Russian threat is assessed in 2025-30, how U.S. commitments to NATO are weighed depending on the 2024 [U.S. presidential] election outcome, and views on the needs and capacity of the European defense industrial base,” Callan said.

With an eye on the health of Europe’s defense industry, the European Union has sought to incentivize deals among its members. Earlier this month, EU officials were expected to meet with member nation delegates to craft ground rules for a €500 million (U.S. $523 million) fund meant to promote quick purchases of bloc-made military equipment.

The U.S. has been working with more than 50 countries to see what weapons they can send to Ukraine. Though the initial focus has been on Russian-made weapons Ukrainian forces were familiar with, Ukraine has received more advanced weapons and the training to go with them as the war’s continued.

DSCA has been part of the Pentagon’s internal efforts to find and fix defense industrial base constraints exposed by the Ukraine effort, and it’s put new focus on acquiring nonstandard systems for allies. That has included the AeroVironment Switchblade 300 loitering munition for Ukraine, Royal said.

“We found that there’s a lot of systems that are not standard systems that the U.S. acquires for itself that are nonetheless very valuable and worthwhile to our partners,” Royal said. “So we’re looking at those non-program-of-record systems and making sure that we are using our program offices to prioritize those requirements for allies and partners just as we would for more standard acquisition systems.”

Beyond Europe, India and other importers of weapons from Russia, the world’s No. 2 arms vendor, have had to rethink those arrangements as widespread sanctions ~~cripple~~ [hurt] Russia’s ability to make and export defense equipment. Without mentioning any specific countries, Royal echoed other U.S. officials who have said the west, if not the U.S., might eat into Russia’s market share.

“We need to be able to demonstrate the reliability of the Western industrial base, the U.S. industrial base, a friendly industrial base, in order to be able to make sure that allies and partners globally can find an alternative to Russian systems in the future,” he said. “That’s very much part of our thinking as well.”

#### Security cooperation resources are limited. Plan trades off

Gregory Dykeman 7, Colonel in the U.S. Army, Chief of Effects Assessment and Targeting in the Strategic Operations Directorate, MultiNational Force Iraq. "Security Cooperation: A Key to the Challenges of the 21st Century" <https://publications.armywarcollege.edu/pubs/1916.pdf> //pipk

Despite successes in execution, as a strategy, security cooperation still faces numerous challenges. Both the international and domestic strategic environments will test our abilities to implement a cooperative strategy framework for the foreseeable future. The conflicts in Iraq and Afghanistan, domestic entitlement programs, and outdated legislative authorities will leave DoD struggling to properly resource the activities necessary to meet our objectives. DoD must also address program effectiveness and improve coordination across the U.S. Government and with our allies.

Resource challenges to security cooperation derive from fiscal constraints, Operational Tempo (OPTEMPO), Global Force Posturing, and outdated authorities. From a fiscal standpoint, the strategic environment will make the task of addressing our security challenges problematic for the foreseeable future. DoD’s 2007 budget is projected to be 3.9 percent of gross domestic product (GDP). As a percentage of GDP, DoD outlays are historically low and have not kept pace with the growth of GDP over the last 40 years.31 However, the rising costs of mandatory government entitlement spending associated with Medicare, Medicaid, and Social Security are projected to account for 11 percent of the U.S. GDP by 2016 and will exert pressures on a budget that economic growth alone is unlikely to alleviate.32 Entitlement obligations will likely result in political pressure to further reduce defense discretionary spending in order to forestall greater budget deficits. Despite the constrained fiscal environment, DoD outlays must continue to grow to meet our global engagement requirements. This should be a continuous strategic communication message implemented by DoD senior leadership to Congress and the American people to counter a growing view that the federal government already spends too much on national defense.33

Despite having the authority to plan and conduct security cooperation within their area of responsibility (AOR), GCCs currently lack sufficient dedicated resources to support their security cooperation strategy. In addition, existing resources are limited by multiple and conflicting policy and legislation. Up to 30 sources of funding regulated by various authorities and guidelines are required to implement GCC security cooperation strategies.34 Security Assistance programs like international military education and training (IMET), foreign military financing (FMF), and financial management service (FMS) are State Department funded, and COCOMs have limited ability through the interagency process to influence where and how this money is spent.35 Other sources like Warsaw Initiative Funding (WIF) and Cooperative Threat Reduction (CTR) funding support military exercises and capacity building efforts but continue to come under increased program management scrutiny. In the past, security cooperation funding by Service Components has contributed significantly to COCOM plan execution. However, Service Chiefs face growing fiscal obligations. As an example, the Army delayed submitting its 2008-13 Program Objective Memorandum in an effort to avoid a QDR strategy and resource mismatch.36 A mismatch still exists, and the Army faces a growing problem in funding current equipment wartime reset requirements and its modernization efforts. In recent congressional testimony, the Army Chief of Staff outlined the Army equipment reset bill at $17.01 billion for FY 2007, with expected requirements beyond 2007 to be $12 to $13 billion per year though the conflict and a minimum of 2 to 3 years beyond.37 Additionally, the Army will need nearly $200 billion for the Future Combat System and its associated spin-off technologies to meet modernization requirements.38 These fiscal realities suggest Service components will have fewer resources to dedicate to security cooperation, as Service Chiefs, who already have less interest in engagement programs, struggle to meet their Title 10 responsibilities to train, organize, and equip their forces.39 To overcome these hurdles, funding streams must be consolidated and reforms initiated that provide GCCs more influence in the allocation of funding resources for security cooperation.

COCOMs will also likely face continued challenges in finding sufficient resources in the form of military personnel to conduct security cooperation programs. The Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan (JSCP) does not apportion forces specifically for security cooperation, and they must come from forces assigned to a COCOM’s AOR or that temporarily deploy for engagement activities.40 For the foreseeable future, the deployment requirements to support the GWOT will continue to leave few opportunities for active and reserve component units to participate in coalition and multinational exercises. In struggling to meet its surge requirements in Iraq and Afghanistan, the U.S. military is falling short in its ability to resource the steady-state deterrence and partner enabling missions called for in the QDR strategy.41 To address this shortcoming, President George W. Bush’s 2008 budget contains proposed funding for an additional end-strength increase of 92,000 troops for the Army and Marine Corps by 2013.42 This increase is not only necessary now, but also is required post-Iraq/Afghanistan. The Army must be forthright and convincing with the nation’s civilian defense leadership about the future force structure required to meet the myriad of “Boots on the Ground” tasks necessitated by an uncertain and complex environment.43

#### Weapons and security assistance are key to beating Russia. That prevents Putin from future escalatory actions that risk war crimes, nuclear war, global famine, and European energy crisis

The Economist 6/30, "How to win Ukraine's long war" <https://www.economist.com/leaders/2022/06/30/how-to-win-ukraines-long-war> //pipk

Ukraine won the short war. Mobile and resourceful, its troops inflicted terrible losses and confounded Russian plans to take Kyiv. Now comes the long war. It will drain weapons, lives and money until one side loses the will to fight on. So far, this is a war that Russia is winning.

In recent days its forces have taken the eastern city of Severodonetsk. They are advancing on Lysychansk and may soon control all of Luhansk province. They also threaten Slovyansk, in the north of next-door Donetsk. Ukrainian leaders say they are outgunned and lack ammunition. Their government reckons as many as 200 of its troops are dying each day.

Fortunately for Ukraine, that is not the end. The Russian advance is slow and costly. With nato-calibre weapons, fresh tactics and enough financial aid, Ukraine has every chance of forcing back Russia’s armies. Even if lost territory will be hard to retake, Ukraine can demonstrate the futility of Vladimir Putin’s campaign and emerge as a democratic, Westward-looking state. But to do so it needs enduring support. And that is still in doubt.

On the face of it, a long war suits Russia. Both sides are using huge amounts of ammunition, but Russia has vastly more. The Russian economy is much larger than Ukraine’s and in far better shape. In pursuit of victory, Russia is willing to terrorise and demoralise the Ukrainians by committing war crimes, as it did by striking a shopping mall in Kremenchuk this week. If needs be, Mr Putin will impose grievous suffering on his own people.

However, the long war does not have to be fought on Mr Putin’s terms. Potentially, Ukraine has vast numbers of motivated fighters. It can be supplied by the West’s defence industry. In 2020, before sanctions, the economies of nato were more than ten times bigger than Russia’s.

Ukraine’s turnaround begins on the battlefield, by stopping and reversing the Russian advance. Mr Putin’s generals will continue to have more weapons, but the sophisticated nato systems now arriving have longer range and greater accuracy. By adopting tactics devised in the cold war, when nato too was outnumbered by the Red Army, Ukraine should be able to destroy Russian command posts and supply depots. Ukraine scored a success on June 30th, when it used nato weapons to drive Russian forces off Snake Island, a strategic prize in the Black Sea. It should aim to impose a “hurting stalemate”, in which it takes back similarly symbolically important territory, such as the city of Kherson, imposing a heavy price on Russia.

If Russia starts to lose ground on the battlefield, dissent and infighting may spread in the Kremlin. Western intelligence services believe that Mr Putin is being kept in the dark by his subordinates. He has a habit of replacing his commanders—reportedly including General Alexander Dvornikov, brought in after the invasion’s first chaotic weeks. The West can raise the cost to Russia of a long war by continuing to press sanctions, which threaten lasting harm to Russia’s economy. It can split Russia’s elites from Mr Putin by welcoming dissenters from business and politics, and encouraging them to see that their country should not throw away its future on a pointless and costly campaign.

Will the West stay the course? At a summit on June 23rd, the European Union awarded Ukraine candidate status, promising a deep level of engagement over the next decade. At another summit in Germany this week, the g7 affirmed and strengthened sanctions against Russia. And at a third in Madrid, nato acknowledged the Russian threat by substantially increasing its presence on the alliance’s eastern front.

Yet Ukraine is a heavy burden. Western defence industries are formidable, but struggle to produce large volumes, especially of ammunition. Ukraine’s government has a monthly deficit of $5bn and the country will need rebuilding after the war. Public support for Ukraine in the West will be buffeted by a host of pressures, from inflation to elections—including, as soon as 2023, campaigning in America that may involve a presidential bid by that Ukrainophobic Putin admirer, Donald Trump.

And the global costs of a long war will grow. Mr Putin has been blockading exports of grains and sunflower oil from Ukraine’s ports, which will cause unrest and starvation in poorer importing countries. He seems to be trying to create gas shortages in the eu this winter by preventing members from building stocks over the summer. If unity falls apart over energy, as eu states hoard gas, it will disintegrate over Ukraine, too. To complicate matters further, nato members worry that if Ukraine gains the upper hand, Mr Putin will escalate. That could draw them into a catastrophic war with Russia.

You can see where Mr Putin is heading. He will take as much of Ukraine as he can, declare victory and then call on Western nations to impose his terms on Ukraine. In exchange, he will spare the rest of the world from ruin, hunger, cold and the threat of nuclear Armageddon.

To accept that deal would be a grave miscalculation. Ukraine would face permanent Russian aggression. The more Mr Putin believes he has succeeded in Ukraine, the more belligerent he will become. He set out his ambitions in a speech this month, smirking as he talked about how Peter the Great seized parts of Sweden. He will fight tomorrow with whatever weapons work for him today. That means resorting to war crimes and nuclear threats, starving the world and freezing Europe.

The best way to prevent the next war is to defeat him in this one. Leaders need to explain to their people that they are not only defending an abstract principle in Ukraine, but also their most fundamental interest: their own security. The eu needs to shore up its energy markets so that they do not fracture next winter. Ukraine must have more weapons. The risk of escalation today is real, but if a bad peace is forced on Ukraine Mr Putin’s nuclear threats will not stop. They will only become more dangerous, especially if Russia’s conventional forces are at a disadvantage.

In the long war ordinary Russians will suffer and Ukrainians endure unspeakable pain for Mr Putin’s vanity. To prevail means marshalling resources and shoring up Ukraine as a viable, sovereign, Western-leaning country—an outcome that its defiant people crave. Ukraine and its backers have the men, money and materiel to overcome Mr Putin. Do they all have the will?

### Overview---2NC

The war in Ukraine has increased the demand for US security cooperation---the Defense Security Cooperation Agency is meeting that demand now but new initiatives from NATO are putting it on the brink---the plan hampers DSCA effectiveness and slows down its ability to meet global needs

### Link Wall---2NC

#### DSCA has broad authority over all security cooperation. Cross apply Santiago 19 from Topicality.

#### Requests for security cooperation generate hidden conflicts that collide with other issues

Matthew E Dunham 15, Major, USAF. He holds a Bachelors of Arts degree in Political Science from Messiah College; a Juris Doctor from The Pennsylvania State University, Dickinson School of Law; and an Masters of Law in International and Operational Law from The Army Judge Advocate General’s Legal Center and School. Worked for the Office of Military Cooperation in Kuwait. 1. ARTICLE: A MOST "IRREGULAR" ASSIGNMENT: A VIEW INTO THE INNER WORKINGS OF A SECURITY COOPERATION ORGANIZATION, 42 The Reporter 34 NEXIS //pipk

In addition to host nation and interagency relationships, a SCO may face challenges working within the joint DoD community. Mission sets, agendas, priorities, personalities and egos abound in foreign countries where there is a sizable DoD presence. At the very least, there are instances when DoD commanders lean far forward to get a particular mission accomplished without full appreciation for the implications. This is understandable, especially if local commanders rotate frequently. SCO personnel, who are more permanent, should anticipate and mitigate these issues through strong working relationships.

To illustrate how varying mission sets among DoD components operating in a host nation can create challenges, consider the following scenario: the Army requests "X" from the host nation to accomplish "Y", while the Air Force needs "A" from the host nation to accomplish "B." The Air Force's request for "A" will make it difficult for the host nation to grant the Army's request for "X." Meanwhile, off the coast the Navy is routinely doing "Z" near host nation territorial waters. The host nation has declared it will not answer any request from the U.S. military until the Navy stops doing "Z." In this scenario, the SCO is the narrow part of the funnel where these issues collide. The Army and Air Force may not know or care [\*38] about the Navy doing "Z," and they each are likely to hold their respective requests as paramount. Meanwhile, the Navy's "Z" operations may be entirely legitimate (it also may not know or care about the Air Force and Army needs).

#### Security cooperation resources are limited. The plan drains money, time, and policy attention from other priorities. Even small distruptions have magnified effect because it hurts our leverage to mobilize other resources

Albert Zaccor 5, Colonel, US Army, Atlantic Council Senior Fellow. Director for Southern Europe in the Office of the Secretary of Defense, International Security Policy – NATO/Europe. "Security Cooperation and Non-State Threats: A Call for an Integrated Strategy" August. <https://www.files.ethz.ch/isn/46290/2005_08_Security_Cooperation_and_Non-State_Threats.pdf> //pipk

This list of capabilities may strike the reader as either entirely too large to focus U.S. Security Cooperation, or woefully incomplete. As to the first objection, the USG already conducts a large number of programs to address virtually all the items on this list and many more, though in a fragmented and non-synchronized manner. Regarding the second objection, while there are many worthwhile capabilities that could be added to the list, limited resources -- not just money, but also time and policy attention -- require us to focus primarily on those capabilities that directly support the fight against strategic crime. The capabilities listed, in many cases, contribute to satisfying more than one American strategic priority (see Figure 1). It is not be possible, of course, for the U.S. to assist all of its partners with every capability on this list, which is why prioritization is essential. Whether or not you agree with all of the items on the list or believe that others should be added, the important thing is to develop a unified interagency position concerning which capabilities deserve focus by country and region in order to craft integrated strategies for applying U.S. Security Cooperation resources.

Identification of Resources A strategic approach to building partner capabilities requires the identification and mobilization of resources. U.S. assistance programs alone cannot and should not bear the burden for building all of the capabilities in the worldwide NOFS. U.S. leadership, enabled by a vision for increased cooperation, strategic planning, and carefully targeted incentives to prompt partner nations to support U.S. priorities, can set the conditions for success. Resources to build partner capabilities are available at the national, intermediate or regional, and global levels.106

#### The brink is low. Each increase in security cooperation risks other priorities. Congress has sufficiently streamlined now but continuing to avoid patchwork security cooperation is key to deterrence. Fiscal year restrictions means even minor delays can spillover

Andrew S. Bowne 18, Major, Judge Advocate, USAF. Presently assigned as a Contract and Fiscal Law Professor, The Judge Advocate General's School, United States Army. 1. ARTICLE: DEFENDING THE NEW FULDA GAP: DETERRING RUSSIAN AGGRESSION AGAINST THE BALTIC STATES THROUGH FISCAL LEGISLATION, 226 Mil. L. Rev. 147. Nexis //pipk

While engagement with foreign states is typically within the purview of the DoS, 179 the last fifteen years has seen a growing emphasis on the role of the DoD in security cooperation activities. 180 Corresponding to that [\*184] increased role, Congress enabled the DoD to respond to threats and build partner capacity through a myriad of authorities and associated funding. 181 The increase in the number of authorities permitting the DoD to engage with foreign militaries, though instrumental in commanders' efforts to improve interoperability in combined operations, resulted in a security cooperation enterprise that is incredibly cumbersome, complicating the ability of the DoD to effectively prioritize, plan, execute, and oversee these activities. 182

The FY17 NDAA attempted to streamline the security cooperation enterprise by consolidating various train and equip authorities into one statute and codifying other security cooperation authorities into one chapter of Title 10 of the U.S. Code. 183 While this reform represented a vast improvement to the previous patchwork of legal authorities and assist DoD efforts to build capacity in the Baltic States under EDI, Congress can and should continue to improve security cooperation laws to maximize its impact in deterring Russian aggression against NATO allies. 184 Two courses of action Congress can take to improve efforts in accordance with the intent of EDI is to 1) authorize multi-year appropriations for EDI activities and 2) exempt certain expenditures of jointly procured equipment and military construction with certain allies, such as the Baltic States and Poland, from DoS concurrence.

1. Relax Funding Restrictions on Periods of Availability Most of the authorities within the security cooperation enterprise have a current fiscal year period of availability, 185 permitting the [\*185] obligation of appropriated funds only within the current fiscal year. 186 However, the complex nature of security cooperation makes it difficult for commanders to identify needs, plan an activity, coordinate appropriately, and receive authorization all within one fiscal year. 187 While the FY17 NDAA permitted training and exercises to cross fiscal years, if started in one and completed in another, 188 time remains a severe constraint on most security cooperation activities. Additional time to plan activities will lead to better use of funds, serving a dual benefit of providing better products to foreign forces and more appropriately utilizing U.S. resources. The flexibility gained by relaxing the time constraints will permit the DoD to complete construction projects that would otherwise not get approved despite the apparent necessity as it is nearly impossible to manage under current the authorities. Lengthening the time of the authorities would also permit planning more complex exercises, which is especially important in areas such as cyber defense and hybrid warfare that are particularly relevant to NATO's counter-Russian aggression strategy. 189 Such relief would likewise enable U.S. forces to complete construction projects and "to accommodate delays in the ordering and delivery of equipment" in NATO partner-nations. 190 Adjusting the period of availability of security cooperation funds to "two-year funding could better account for the unpredictability of foreign partner schedules." 191

#### Security cooperation coordination is hard. It has to be approved by senior-most echelons, which means even small things like the plan are cumbersome and time-intensive. That takes out solvency but not the link.

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2. Provide Exemptions from DoS Coordination Another way Congress can help streamline the security cooperation process is to legislate exemptions for certain activities from prior coordination between DoD and DoS. There is the potential for relatively low-cost, high-reward activities that may not be possible if the planning takes too long. Congress recognized the process for coordination between the two departments on security cooperation programs "is too ad-hoc in nature and often elevates responsibility for such coordination, particularly those requiring concurrence, to the senior-most echelons of the respective organizations--to include the Deputy Secretary or Secretary level--resulting in a cumbersome and time-intensive process." 195 Although the legislative history is clear, Congress intended for the secretaries to "designate individuals at the lowest level in their respective organizations with responsibility for such coordination," 196 the new laws still require concurrence and coordination at the secretary level. 197

[\*187] Foreign assistance and security cooperation are traditionally diplomatic functions; however, the nature of coalition defense requires a singular voice, and in many cases, that voice should come from the Secretary of Defense. Thus, for small-scale projects that support the mission essential tasks of the combatant commander, Congress should limit the requirements for pre-coordination and concurrence. Rather than require additional levels of bureaucratic red tape that limit the utility and effectiveness of an otherwise useful security cooperation authorization, Congress could exempt logistic support, loans of military equipment, and certain small-scale construction projects from the requirement of prior DoS concurrence for each activity. By shifting the focus from prior coordination to reporting, the DoS and Congress will maintain oversight while allowing the DoD the necessary flexibility to provide support when and where it is needed. The exemption from inter-agency concurrence could be for specified equipment, dollar thresholds, as well as for properly vetted and approved recipient countries, such as the Baltic States and Poland, that have supported the United States in its operations in Afghanistan, meet the NATO defense spending thresholds, support democracy, human rights and civilian control of the military, and have a clear connection to the United States' security interests.

#### Implementation is difficult. Patchwork authorization laws create confusion about statutory authority and risk draining appropriations for other activities

Colonel Luisa Santiago et al 19, Captain Harry Parent, Captain Reed Lorch, Major Deidre Baker, Lieutenant Colonel Timothy Litka, Colonel Luisa Santiago, U.S. Army Reserve Command staff judge advocate; Colonel Anthony Adolph, General Counsel (Staff Judge Advocate) - United States Forces Korea; and Colonel William Smoot, Chief, Criminal Law Division, U.S. Army OTJAG. FEATURE: No. 3 Fostering Enduring Partnerships: An Overview of Security Cooperation Offices Through the Lens of Iraq, 2019 Army Law. 49, Nexis //pipk

Authorities and Funding

Security Cooperation Offices derive their authorities and funding from a variety of sources, but predominately through appropriations under Title 10, Title 22, and release of funds held in the Security Assistance Administrative Trust Fund, which is a depository account held by Defense Finance and Accounting Service for administrative fees paid by host nations on foreign military sales cases.

The complexity of SCO authorities and funding can be highlighted by a comparison of three recent reports: RAND's February 2016 From Patchwork to Framework: A Review of Title 10 Authorities for Security Cooperation, 42 Congressional Research Service (CRS)'s August 2016 DoD Security Cooperation: An Overview of Authorities and Issues, 43 and GAO's March 2017 Building Partner Capacity: Inventory of Department of Defense Security Cooperation and Department of State's Security Assistance Efforts. 44

The RAND report catalogs 123 Title 10 authorities relating to SC, which it notes are in addition to statutes in Title 22 and other legislation, as well as programs that arise out of appropriations rather than authorizations, with a resulting conclusion that delivery of security cooperation is increasingly difficult for the DoD personnel who develop, plan, and execute initiatives with foreign partners. 45

The CRS report estimates there are "more than 80 separate authorities to assist and engage with foreign governments, militaries, security forces, and populations...." 46 It goes on to state that other organizations have adopted different counting methodologies, resulting in a larger number of authorities, noting a different, earlier RAND report from 2013, titled Review of Security Cooperation Mechanisms Combatant Commands Utilize to Build Partner Capacity, 47 which listed 184 separate authorities, including authorities under Titles 6, 22, 32, 42, 50, public laws, and executive orders. 48

The GAO, in its report, identified 194 DoD SC and DoS SA efforts that may be used to build partner capacity to address security-related threats. 49 Of those, eighty-seven are DoD efforts requiring some level of DoS involvement, and thirty are DoS efforts requiring some level of DoD involvement. 50

Upon review of the draft report, the Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense (OASD) responded that the GAO's study methodology was flawed. Reasons included that a number of listed efforts are not [\*53] used to build partner capacity, such as the Afghanistan-Pakistan Hands program, Bi-Lateral Meetings, and Counterpart Visits of Senior Foreign Officials. 51 Additionally, OASD noted that the report's conflation of terms such as "programs," "activities," and "authorities" leads to an overall inventory that is misleading and repetitive. For example, "Global Train and Equip" authority under 10 U.S.C. § 2282 is cited only once, while "Multilateral, bilateral, or regional cooperation programs: payment of personnel expenses" authority under 10 U.S.C. § 1051 is described as an "activity" and cited at least twenty-three times. 52 Moreover, the report did not include updates for the FY2017 NDAA, which included modification or repeal of at least twenty-one authorities. 53 The letter stated that the 2016 RAND report may serve as a more accurate reference for DoD SC authorities. 54

The 2016 RAND report includes an appendix listing authorities, categorized as activity-based, mission-based, or partner-based, and further breaking each of those categories out into subgroups. It also lists twenty-seven SC programs introduced through appropriations legislation or other means. 55

The activity-based authority subgroups are: military-to-military engagements; exercises; individual education/technical training; unit train and equip; equipment and logistics support; research, development, test, and evaluation (RDT&E); intelligence sharing and exchange. 56

The mission-based subgroups are: humanitarian assistance/health; defense institution building; counter-narcotics; cooperative threat reduction and nonproliferation; counterterrorism; cooperative ballistic missile defense; maritime security; and cybersecurity. 57

The partner-based authorities are not subgrouped, but include authorities for Afghanistan, Burma, Iraq, Israel, Jordan, Pakistan, Syria, Uganda, and Ukraine, as well as regional authorities encompassing Africa, Europe, the Independent States of the Former Soviet Union, the Indo-Asia-Pacific Region, and the Levant. 58

Three clear takeaways that can be consistently drawn from a review of these reports are: (1) SC encompasses a vast number of authorities and appropriations which may be onerous to navigate at the SCO level; (2) Given the number and broad range of authorities, it is likely that whatever SC-related activity an SCO is interested in performing it is covered by an authority with a corresponding appropriation; the challenge is identifying it early enough in the planning cycle to allow time to confirm fund availability; (3) Close coordination with the GCC, DSCA, and DoS will likely be necessary to ensure funds are available to the SCO to conduct the desired security cooperation activity.

For a judge advocate beginning an assignment at an SCO, one of the first priorities should be to learn what authorities the SCO has historically relied on. Depending on the size and staff structure of the SCO, that may mean coordination with [\*54] the SCO J-3/5 and J-8, or reaching back to COCOM staff to inquire.

Throughout an assignment at an SCO, judge advocates can add value to planning cycles by reminding staff to always consider the source of authorities in planning future activities. The broad range of security cooperation activities also creates an environment where an unauthorized commitment may occur if a proper fiscal analysis is not performed or if availability of funds is not confirmed in advance.

### Ukraine Aid High---2NC

#### Big new package is coming

VOA News 7/2, "US Announces $820 Million Military Aid Package for Ukraine" <https://www.voanews.com/a/us-announces-820-million-military-aid-package-for-ukraine-/6642302.html> //pipk

The United States announced details Friday of $820 million in additional military aid for Ukraine, including new surface-to-air missile systems and counter-artillery radar.

The latest aid package is designed to help Ukraine counter Russia's use of long-range missiles and follows calls by Ukrainian officials for Western countries to send more advanced weapons systems that can better match Moscow's equipment.

The Pentagon said Friday the Biden administration has now sent $7.6 billion in security assistance to Ukraine, including nearly $7 billion since the start of Russia's invasion of Ukraine at the end of February.

U.S. President Joe Biden said at a news conference during this week's NATO summit in Madrid that the United States is "going to support Ukraine as long as it takes."

The 14th U.S. package of military aid for Ukraine include two air defense systems, known as NASAMS, which can help Ukrainian forces defend against cruise missiles and aircraft.

A view shows a damaged vehicle, as Russia's invasion of Ukraine continues, in Bakhmut, Donetsk Oblast, Ukraine in this still image obtained from a social media video released on July 2, 2022. National Police of Ukraine/Handout via REUTERS

A senior U.S. official said the systems are NATO-standard defense systems and are part of an effort to update Ukraine's air defenses from a Soviet-era system to a modern one.

"The Ukrainians are doing a magnificent job of employing their existing air defense systems, but we all know that Soviet-type systems means that it's Russian made … so over time it will be harder to sustain with the spare parts," the official said.

The latest military aid package also provides Ukrainians with up to 150,000 rounds of 155-millimeter artillery ammunition as well as additional ammunition for medium-range rocket systems the United States provided Ukraine in June.

Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy said in his daily address, “I am especially grateful to the United States of America and personally to Biden for the new support package for Ukraine. ... We are no less actively negotiating about other new weapons from our partners. ...We are doing everything to break the advantage of the occupiers.”

On the battlefront Friday, at least 21 people were killed and dozens injured in Russian missile strikes in Ukraine's Odesa region. At least one of the sites that were hit was a residential building. Ukrainian military officials said two children were among the dead, and the search for survivors is ongoing.

The missile struck the nine-story building in the town of Bilhorod-Dnistrovskyi, according to a Ukraine Defense Ministry statement.

Serhiy Bratchuk, spokesperson for the Odesa regional administration, said on Ukrainian state television that a rescue operation continues to free people buried under the rubble after a section of the building collapsed. Another missile hit a resort facility, Bratchuk said, wounding several people.

Russia has denied targeting civilians in the attack.

"I would like to remind you of the president's words that the Russian Armed Forces do not work with civilian targets," Kremlin spokesperson Dmitry Peskov said.

Zelenskyy's chief of staff accused Russia of waging a war on civilians.

In his nightly video address Friday, Zelenskyy called the strikes "conscious, deliberately targeted Russian terror and not some sort of error or a coincidental missile strike."

Ukrainian State Emergency Service firefighters work at a damaged residential building in the town of Serhiivka, about 50 kilometers southwest of Odesa, Ukraine, July 1, 2022.

Ukrainian State Emergency Service firefighters work at a damaged residential building in the town of Serhiivka, about 50 kilometers southwest of Odesa, Ukraine, July 1, 2022.

Zelenskyy also said 12 missiles also hit Mykolaiv.

Friday's missile attack in Odesa came hours after Russia said it had pulled its forces from Ukraine's Snake Island on Thursday. The strategic island had become a symbol of Ukrainian resistance since Moscow's invasion four months ago.

Russia had used the Black Sea island near Odesa as a staging ground after seizing it in the early stages of the war, launching attacks on Ukraine from it and monitoring shipments from Ukrainian ports.

Ukraine confirmed Russian forces had pulled out after Ukrainian forces hit the island with missile and artillery strikes overnight, leaving the remaining Russian forces to escape in two speedboats.

The Russian Defense Ministry claimed it had left the small island "as a symbol of goodwill" after completing its mission there.

A senior U.S. official said the United States does "not believe there is any credence to what Russia is saying, that this is a gesture of goodwill." The official said the retreat was more about Ukraine's efforts to defend the island and Kyiv's use of weapons like harpoon missiles.

"The Ukrainians made it very hard for the Russians to sustain their operations there, made them very vulnerable to Ukrainian strikes," the official said.

In other developments, European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen told Ukraine's parliament that EU membership was "within reach" but urged them to press forward with anti-corruption reforms.

"You have created an impressive anti-corruption machine," she told the lawmakers by video link Friday. Von der Leyen stressed that Brussels and the EU member states were firmly behind Ukraine in both its battle with the ongoing Russian invasion and the quest to be "reunited with our European family."

For his part Zelenskyy said Ukraine and the European Union were starting a new chapter of their history after Brussels formally accepted Ukraine's candidacy to join the 27-nation bloc.

"We made a journey of 115 days to candidate status and our journey to membership shouldn't take decades. We should make it down this road quickly," Zelenskyy said.

At the NATO meeting in Madrid, Western leaders, including Biden, proclaimed their continued military and humanitarian support for Ukraine.

Norway announced $1 billion in aid to Ukraine over two years, as Norwegian Prime Minister Jonas Gahr Store visited the country.

The fund is for "humanitarian aid, reconstruction of the country, weapons and operational support to the (Ukrainian) authorities," the Norwegian government said in a statement Friday.

"We stand together with the Ukrainian people," Store said in the statement.

"We help support the Ukrainians' struggle for freedom. They are fighting for their country, but also for our democratic values."

#### Ukraine aid coming. It’s key to victory

Joe Gould 6/15, senior Pentagon reporter for Defense News. "US sending Ukraine new $1 billion arms package amid grinding Donbas fight" <https://www.defensenews.com/pentagon/2022/06/15/us-sending-ukraine-new-1-billion-arms-package-amid-grinding-donbas-fight/> //pipk

The U.S. will send Ukraine another $1 billion in weapons to fight Russia, including Harpoon anti-ship launchers for the first time, and more ammunition for high-tech, medium-range rocket launchers, the Biden administration announced Wednesday.

The U.S. aid will include two Harpoon launchers and an unspecified number of Guided Multiple Launch Rocket System, or GMLRS, rockets for previously committed M142 High Mobility Artillery Rocket Systems, or HIMARS, U.S. Defense Secretary Lloyd Austin announced in Brussels. Also included are 18 M777 howitzers, 36,000 rounds of 155mm ammunition and thousands of secure radios.

Amid calls from Washington and Kyiv for more and faster shipments of weapons for Ukrainian forces, Austin and Gen. Mark Milley, the chairman of the U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, acknowledged Russia’s military superiority and defended U.S. and allied efforts to even the odds. With Ukrainian forces facing a tough fight for Eastern Ukraine, the U.S. has been sending arms meant to take out positions from which Russian forces launch brutal artillery barrages.

“When you’re in the fight, you can never get enough, and you can never get it quick enough,” Austin said at a press conference with Milley. “But having said all that, we’re going to work hard to make sure we’re doing everything humanly possible ― we’re going to continue to move heaven and earth to get them the capability that they need.”

The new U.S. aid uses a combination of $350 million in presidential authority to draw equipment from U.S. military stocks and $650 million in the separate Ukraine Security Assistance Initiative. Defense officials say the Pentagon plans to use USAI to buy truck-mounted Harpoon launchers, which the U.S. doesn’t operate, but the missiles themselves would come from allies and partners. Denmark previously committed to providing Harpoons to Ukraine.

Austin hosted a meeting of about 50 nations at NATO headquarters in Brussels to discuss the weapons deliveries to the invaded nation. Afterward, he highlighted three multiple-launch rocket systems and GMLRS ammunition for Ukraine from Germany, Mi-series helicopters and rockets from Slovakia and artillery donations from Canada, Poland and the Netherlands.

Though Russia has more artillery, it’s using it for mass fires and isn’t necessarily hitting military targets, as Ukrainian forces are, Milley said. He argued Russia’s slow-moving gains in the nearly four-month war don’t mean its victory in Eastern Ukraine is inevitable.

“War takes many, many turns, so I wouldn’t say it’s an inevitability, but I would say the numbers do favor the Russians. In terms of artillery, they do outnumber, they outgun and outrange ... and they do have enough forces,” Milley said. “But the Russians have run into a lot of problems. They’ve got command and control issues, logistics issues, morale issues and leadership issues.”

The administration pledged June 1 it would send the HIMARS, with GMLRS rockets that have a range of about 40 miles. Milley said Wednesday that by the end of the month, the U.S. will have supplied the systems and trained Ukrainian crews to operate and maintain them.

Within weeks, Ukrainian forces will have 10 multiple launch rocket systems from U.S., UK, and Germany, with more than 100 rounds of ammunition. “They’re top notch gunners, and the effect that they’re achieving on the battlefield right now with the [M777s] has been very, very good, very effective ― and we expect the same out of the HIMARS,” Milley said.

U.S. President Joe Biden announced the aid Wednesday after he held a call with Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy. The U.S. is also sending $225 million in humanitarian assistance, including medical supplies, food, shelter, and cash for families to purchase essential items.

“The bravery, resilience, and determination of the Ukrainian people continues to inspire the world. And the United States, together with our allies and partners, will not waver in our commitment to the Ukrainian people as they fight for their freedom,” Biden said.

U.S. Defense Secretary Lloyd Austin, left, greets Ukraine's Defense Minister Oleksii Reznikov ahead of a NATO defence ministers' meeting at NATO headquarters in Brussels, Wednesday, June 15, 2022. NATO defense ministers, attending a two-day meeting starting Wednesday, will discuss beefing up weapons supplies to Ukraine, and Sweden and Finland's applications to join the transatlantic military alliance. (Yves Herman, Pool Photo via AP)

Noting “painful” losses in Severodonetsk, which he said would be the key to controlling the Donbas region, Zelenskyy pleaded anew with the West for more and faster deliveries of arms in a statement Tuesday. Ukraine needs “modern anti-missile weapons,” he said, adding that its air defense units had shot down “some” Russian missiles fired at Ukrainian cities.

“Even though Russia has fewer and fewer modern missiles with each passing day, Ukraine’s need for such systems remains,” Zelenskyy said

Republicans and Democrats in Congress have criticized the Biden administration directly in recent days, urging it to do more.

House Armed Services Committee Chairman Adam Smith, D-Wash., said he’s told the administration “near constantly” that it’s been overly timid about sending Ukraine sophisticated systems like long-range artillery and the Grey Eagle, a reusable flying drone with a 200-mile range that is used by the U.S. Army.

“I think we need to be giving more sophisticated systems, particularly when it comes to drones and long-range artillery,” Smith said Wednesday at a wide-ranging reporters’ roundtable ahead of the administration’s announcement. “I think we ought to get them that equipment more quickly.”

The administration’s been “too cautious” as it considers the risks of exposing U.S. technology and how long it will take to train Ukrainian troops, Smith added.

The U.S. has sent Ukrainian forces the Puma flying drone and Switchblade loitering munition as well as the Phoenix Ghost, a new drone developed by the U.S. Air Force.

Ukraine promised the U.S. it would not strike deep into Russian territory as part of the deal to acquire HIMARS ― a step meant to avoid escalating the war.

But Smith said he disagrees with Biden’s decision not to supply Ukraine with longer-range rockets that can reach into Russia and that the U.S. should be sending even more artillery and ammunition to help Ukraine stand up to Russia’s superior weaponry.

“Quantity is a huge part of the issue right now,” Smith said.

Amid such criticism, Pentagon policy chief Colin Kahl said Tuesday the U.S. intends to continue to send Ukraine what it needs and that the powerful, precision GMLRS ammunition allows Ukrainian forces to get more impact for a single shot.

“Think of this more like the effect of an airstrike than launching off full salvos,” Kahl said at a Center for a New American Security event. “In other words, you can do a lot for a little or you don’t need a lot to have a significant effect.”

Overall, the U.S. has committed about $4.6 billion in security assistance to Ukraine since the beginning of the Biden administration, including $3.9 billion since Russia invaded.

The Pentagon has pivoted to supplying Ukraine with western weapons like the M777 howitzer or truck-mounted HIMARS as stocks from former Warsaw Pact countries that match Ukraine’s Soviet-era weapons have run out, Kahl said.

He downplayed reports of Russia’s progress, saying both Russian and Ukrainian forces are taking “significant casualties.” Still, Kahl said Russian President Vladimir Putin, after failing to take Kyiv in the war’s early days, continues to want to take over Ukraine completely.

“Our sense is that he has not changed his overall objectives,” Kahl said. “He has designs on a significant portion of Ukraine, if not the whole country. That said, I do not think he can achieve those objectives.”

### AT: Ukraine Support Inev---2NC

#### Support is not inevitable

Dan Sabbagh 6/12, Guardian's defence and security editor. "Ukraine fears western support will fade as media loses interest in the war" <https://www.theguardian.com/world/2022/jun/12/ukraine-fears-western-support-will-fade-as-media-loses-interest-in-the-war> //pipk

Ukraine’s war with Russia is heading towards its fifth month amid increasing local concern that dwindling media attention could lead to a gradual loss of western support just as Moscow is making slow but steady gains on the frontline.

The anxiety reflects a growing normalisation of the conflict in which large parts of the country feel distant from the war in eastern Donbas – as it becomes clear that casualties are mounting and economic costs soaring. “It’s a very real threat, that people get tired psychologically,” said Lesia Vasylenko, an opposition MP with the liberal Holos party.

International media coverage has dropped markedly in the past two months, she added, and “as that number goes down further, there’s a very high risk of the support from the west going down”.

Ukraine has become increasingly dependent on western help as the war has continued, both in terms of weaponry and humanitarian support, and will need international aid money to help rebuild towns and cities destroyed by the Russians in the early phase of fighting. Its treasury is bare.

Russia, meanwhile, appears close to taking the shattered Donbas city of Sievierodonetsk, after a failed counterattack by Ukraine’s forces.

After weeks of silence about casualties, key Ukrainian presidential advisers have admitted in the past week that as many as 150 are being killed in fighting every day and 800 wounded.

Weapons supply remains top of the list of Ukraine’s demands. This week Kyiv admitted it had all but run out of Soviet-standard stocks. There is frustration with the pace of supply, and criticism of President Volodymyr Zelenskiy’s government for not devolving operational decision making further down the chain.

Two military commanders, who asked not to be named, told the Observer that for all the president’s international achievements, not enough had been done to tackle the military’s post-communist bureaucracy, and that supplies of some key equipment, such as encrypted battlefield radio, were short.

Complaints include a lack of practical unit-level information-sharing with the west or points of contact to help with weapons training. There is also an absence of ways to find out what equipment might be available, and a need for practical help with the logistics transfer from munitions hubs in south-east Poland.

They even wondered if there was a relative lack of urgency on the part of the country’s leaders. “It would be better if Kyiv was under threat,” murmured one, arguing that some of the pace had gone out of the war effort once it was clear the Russian assault on the capital had failed in April.

A missile attack on a railway yard in a distant eastern suburb last Sunday was the first strike on the city for over five weeks. Air raid sirens go off periodically but nobody in the relatively busy capital reacts. Danger seldom follows – and there is a fatalism that, if a missile does strike, nothing much could be done about it.

Scratch the surface, and the story is very different. An estimated 7 million Ukrainians are internally displaced, according to the UN, and while many people have lost loved ones, the city is also full of everyday stories like Yana’s, an IT worker whose house near the border east of Kharkiv was overrun by Russian soldiers on the first day of the war.

It took the 31-year-old and her mother until this week to get back to Kyiv, where they can stay with an aunt, first via her brother’s in St Petersburg, Russia, and then, when they were confident “there would be something to return to”, back to their homeland via Estonia. But their house remains in occupied territory and it is unclear what condition it is in.

There are more ominous reports about the situation in the occupied territories, where Russia has been trying to issue passports and where this week some officials in Zaporizhzhia were indicating there were plans to hold referendums on whether the territory should join Russia

Tamila Tasheva, permanent representative of the president of Ukraine for occupied Crimea, has also been monitoring the situation in neighbouring Kherson, taken by Russian forces in the first days of the war. She believes there have been 600 cases of imprisonment and torture in Kherson province since the war began, and “maybe one or two million people deported” from Ukraine to Russia by the invaders.

Those closer to the president are more philosophical about waning media attention – as long as western politicians do not lose focus, and unity among Nato allies remains relatively strong.

Oleksiy Arestovych, a high-profile military adviser to the president’s office, said media fatigue was unavoidable as the conflict drew on. “It was inevitable that the Johnny Depp/Amber Heard trial garnered more views and likes than the war. People are getting weary and tired, but we couldn’t care less. You don’t have to talk about us at all. Just give us the weapons,” he told the Observer.

But there was a real sense of relief in Kyiv circles that Boris Johnson survived Monday’s no-confidence vote. Zelenskiy said that victory was “great news” on Tuesday.

The president looked obviously pleased on Friday as he greeted Ben Wallace, the defence secretary, on his surprise visit. Wallace was there to discuss how the UK “will continue to meet Ukraine’s needs as the conflict enters a different phase”, the Ministry of Defence said.

“The thing that Ukrainians dreaded most was the possibility of the no-confidence vote for Boris Johnson leading to a change of government,” added Vasylenko, who has an informal role as a link to British politicians. “Any change of government means time for reshuffling and attention away from Ukraine,” added the MP, who is due to travel to the UK next week.

Ukraine’s military tactic seems to amount to fighting hard and taking high casualties to slow down the Russian attempt to capture Sievierodonetsk and the rest of the Donbas region while hoping that newly promised western weapons – such as multiple rocket launchers from the US and UK – will allow its embattled forces to take back territory lost to the invaders.

Meanwhile, there is particular frustration with Germany for being slow on weapons supply and France for appearing to be more willing to engage with Russian president Vladimir Putin. Arestovych focused on Germany, where six weeks after the Bundestag voted overwhelmingly to send heavy weapons to Ukraine, nothing has been received. Howitzers are expected later this month and Gepard mobile artillery in July.

The anxiety is that slow supply is preventing Ukraine from winning. “If we had all the weapons the Germans had been talking about, we would have kicked out the Russians, Kherson would have been liberated,” Arestovych said – before going on to describe Olaf Scholz’s government as “disgraceful” and accusing the chancellor of trying to engage in a flawed balancing act aimed at not hurting the Russians excessively.

### DSCA Effective Now---2NC

#### DSCA is effective now but is facing a post-COVID spike in demand. Gradual reforms are in progress but the overall process is currently efficient

Colin Clark 22, founding editor of Breaking Defense, also started DoDBuzz.com, the world’s first all-online defense news website. "New DSCA director eschews big changes; ‘continuous reform’ instead" Feburary 16. <https://breakingdefense.com/2022/02/exclusive-new-dsca-director-eschews-big-reforms-continuous-reform-instead/> //pipk

In his first interview, the new director of the Defense Security Cooperation Agency said he plans to pursue incremental and targeted improvements to the agency’s primary responsibility of coordinating the export of American weapons.

America’s defense industry, along with the allies and partners who buy US made weapons, have complained for decades that the US government moves too slowly in approving sales and implementing policies. The State Department has primary responsibility for approving arms exports, with DSCA, a Pentagon agency, having oversight once a deal has been approved.

It has become almost a ritual for the head of DSCA to announce a review of the agency’s policies and the laws governing them or to commit to a wholesale reform effort to “fix” things. But despite a major focus on defense export reforms under both the Obama and Trump administrations, it’s not clear how much things have actually improved; two senior defense company executives said here they still believe DSCA moves too slowly in approving sales.

But the new DSCA director, Jim Hursch, wants to take a different tack.

“So, you know, there have been many reform efforts for military sales over the last 20 to 30 years. And in each case, you know, usually marginal improvements are made; some things get better. But I don’t see it worthwhile to expend a huge amount of energy in the short term on a full-scale review,” Hursch told Breaking Defense on Tuesday.

“What I think we need to do is continuous product improvement or process improvement, and look for ways as we go along to either do things better, or find new approaches, rather than doing a full-scale reform review that stops everything, takes a huge amount of time and effort away from other things,” Hursch said. “The fact is that most of our processes, particularly in the Foreign Military Sales cases, I think work extremely well.”

He said that most of what he hears when comes to events like the Singapore Air Show is that a country will tell him they have a problem with a particular arms export case. The cases that really get hung up rarely are caught in the DSCA process. Instead, he says, “they’re either foreign policy or they’re technology security policy questions. Neither of those are easy answers, and neither of them will always get solved.”

What has struck Hursch since he took the post six weeks ago?

“So, I think the first thing I’d say, is that I’ve been very impressed with the agency and security cooperation workforce that we have. There are improvements we can make. We need to think about how we better train and prepare folks for these jobs,” he said.

“I don’t think it’s anything that will be, you know, sort of a big surprise to anybody, but I do think that one thing that continues to be an issue that we need to attack from my time when I was director of DTSA [Defense Technology Security Administration] 10 years ago is, that I think we need to continue to work to make sure that our technology security and disclosure processes are working as efficiently as possible.”

In 2021, DSCA oversaw more than 15,000 FMS cases worth more than half a trillion dollars, and finalized over $35 billion in FMS sales, a decline from 2020’s almost $45 billion in cases. But Hursch noted that the three-year “rolling average” of such sales is $47 billion. Because single sales can cause huge spikes from year to year, DSCA has long focused on a multi-year average as opposed to tracking annually.

Hursch thinks the pandemic played a significant role in slowing sales. “Last year was based on COVID impacts that were happening around the world. So other countries perhaps didn’t get as far in their own processes. Several countries were looking to make sure they were taking care of health care issues at home and may have moved their budgets in that direction,” he said.

“And, I think, as we come out of the pandemic, and especially given recent developments in the world, I think we will continue to see relatively high amount of sales. And I think the other thing that needs to be noted is that, you know, American products continue to be the best products in the world.”

### DSCA key to Ukraine---2NC

#### Defense Security Cooperation Agency key to Ukrainian arms transfers but they’re on the brink of overstretch now. Worsening performance risks transfers and triggers Congressional cuts due to lack of oversight

Valerie Insinna 7/1, “DoD agency wants to put weapons monitors on the ground in Ukraine” <https://breakingdefense.com/2022/07/dod-agency-wants-to-put-weapons-monitors-on-the-ground-in-ukraine/> //pipk

The Defense Department agency responsible for overseeing foreign arms sales would like to have a presence on the ground to monitor the use of US weapons in Ukraine, but when that will happen is still unclear, its deputy director said Thursday.

“We do think that over time, we would like to be able to extend our insights with a greater presence on the ground going forward,” Jed Royal, deputy director of the Defense Security Cooperation Agency, told reporters during a roundtable.

During peacetime, DSCA sends personnel to a foreign nation to open warehouses and arms bunkers to examine equipment and check the serial numbers of high-value weapon systems, Royal said. “Right now, in Ukraine, that’s just not available to us as a tool.”

Currently, DSCA has personnel stationed in Europe that work directly with Ukrainians on arms transfers occurring outside of Ukraine, using paper receipts to track weapons as they move down echelon. However, those officials are “somewhat limited” in their ability to do more robust monitoring of US made weapons, Royal said.

“Once we have more people in country, we should be in a position to actually go do more physical validation [and] verification, going forward,” he said. “That’s the kind of thing that we’re looking for here. It still won’t be like a peacetime environment for it. So we’re going to have to get creative in how we do this.”

Royal added that the agency is not looking to send an “operational detachment,” but eventually hopes to have a security cooperation office in Ukraine similar to those DSCA has based in other countries.

“I wouldn’t venture [to guess] in terms of when we will be able to do that or what the what the operational status might be, or the threat environment might be in Ukraine [when we do that],” he said, adding that the decision would not be made internally by DSCA but would fall to more senior government officials.

Until then, the assurances DSCA officials have received from the Ukrainians are “very robust and satisfactory,” he said.

Getting weapons from American stockpiles to Ukrainian forces involves several US agencies, with DSCA responsible for coming up with options of US gear that can meet Ukraine’s requirements, conducting the necessary security reviews, and pushing those proposal to senior government leaders, who ultimately make the decision on which arms to send.

The United States has delivered more than $6 billion in arms to Ukraine since Russia invaded in February. On Thursday, President Joe Biden said that the US would announce another package worth $800 million in the coming days, which would include “advanced Western air defense system for Ukraine, more artillery and ammunition, counter-battery radars, additional ammunition for the HIMARS multiple launch rocket system we’ve already given Ukraine and more HIMARS coming from other countries as well,” he said.

While Congress has been broadly supportive of security assistance to Ukraine, lawmakers across the political spectrum — including Sens. Rand Paul, R-Ky., and Elizabeth Warren, D-Mass. — have raised concerns about the department’s seeming lack of oversight.

### SC key to Ukraine---2NC

#### Assistance to Ukraine is key to them winning

David Leonhardt 7/6, senior writer for The New York Times. "Three War Scenarios" <https://www.nytimes.com/2022/07/06/briefing/ukraine-war-three-scenarios.html> //pipk

Avril Haines, the U.S. director of national intelligence, recently outlined three plausible scenarios in Ukraine.

In the first, Russia’s continuing progress in eastern Ukraine would break Ukrainians’ will to fight and allow the Russian military to take over even more of the country. This outcome is Vladimir Putin’s new goal after being defeated in his initial attempt to oust Ukraine’s government.

In the second scenario — the most likely one, Haines said (during a public appearance in Washington last week) — Russia would dominate the east but would not be able to go much farther. The two countries would fall into a stalemate that Haines described as “a grinding struggle.”

In the third scenario, Ukraine would halt Russia’s advance in the east and also succeed in launching counterattacks. Ukraine has already regained some territory, especially in the southern part of the country, and some military experts expect a broader offensive soon.

Today’s newsletter provides an update on the war by examining a few questions that will help determine which of these three scenarios becomes most likely.

Temporary or permanent

Has the tide definitively turned or are Ukrainian forces about to have more success?

The most recent phase of the war has gone well for Russia. The eastern part of Ukraine, known as the Donbas region, has two provinces — Luhansk and Donetsk. Russia now controls virtually all of Luhansk and about 60 percent of Donetsk, according to Thomas Bullock, an analyst for Janes, a company specializing in intelligence issues.

Yesterday, Russian forces increased their shelling near Bakhmut, a city in Donetsk that’s an important Ukrainian supply hub. Russia used a similar tactic in Luhansk to clear Ukrainian forces and civilians before taking over cities.

“The Kremlin is sending the message that their overall plans haven’t changed and that everything is going according to plan,” Anton Troianovski, The Times’s Moscow bureau chief, said. In a sign of confidence in the Kremlin, Russian media have recently been reporting plans for holding referendums in the captured territories and formally annexing them, Anton added.

But Ukraine does continue to benefit from an influx of sophisticated weapons from the West. And there is some reason to wonder whether Ukrainian troops will soon be able to make better use of those weapons than they have so far.

In the initial phase of the war, the U.S., E.U. and other Ukrainian allies were sending relatively simple weapons, like the shoulder-fired missile systems known as Javelins. Those weapons helped Ukraine defend territory from small groups of Russian forces. More recently, the West has sent more powerful artillery — like the HIMARS, a truck-based rocket system — meant to help Ukraine withstand the massive buildup of Russian troops in the east.

Training somebody to use a Javelin can take just a few hours, my colleague Julian Barnes points out. Training troops to use a HIMARS can take days or weeks — as does transporting them to the battlefield. In coming weeks, Julian said he would be watching to see whether Ukraine would be able to use its growing supply of HIMARS to inflict more damage on Russian troops.

(Here’s more on the early effect of the HIMARS from Eric Schmitt and John Ismay of The Times.)

No Russian draft

Is Russia running out of troops?

Two recent developments have offered reason to wonder. First, Russia has had to turn to outside troops — like those from the Wagner Group, a private company — to replenish their units, as my colleague Thomas Gibbons-Neff explained in his recent analysis of the war. Second, Putin ordered some of the troops involved in recent victories in the Donbas region to rest, suggesting that those units were exhausted.

“American officials and outside analysts both agree if Russia wants to move beyond the Donbas, they will need to take a step they have been unwilling to do: a mass mobilization,” Julian said. “Russia will need to conduct a military draft, recall soldiers who previously served and take politically painful steps to rebuild their force. So far, Putin has been unwilling to do so.”

Russia has many more resources than Ukraine, including soldiers and weapons. But Russia’s resources do have limits, especially if Putin is unwilling to spend political capital on a mass mobilization.

These limits raise the prospect that Ukraine can hold Russia’s gains to the east and slowly exhaust Russian troops with counterattacks and internal resistance — as well as Western economic sanctions. That situation, in turn, could lead Putin to accept an eventual cease-fire that leaves most of Ukraine intact.

“That will not be a perfect victory,” Julian said, “but it might be realistic.”

Shell shock

But is Ukraine running out of troops even faster?

Both sides appear to be suffering a similarly high rate of casualties — hundreds per day. As a result, Ukraine has had to rely increasingly on troops with little training.

The surviving troops are also at risk of psychological damage. The method of fighting in the east — an unceasing exchange of artillery — resembles the trench warfare of World War I, which gave rise to the term “shell shock,” my colleague Thomas notes.

“During the artillery shelling, all you can do is lay in the shelter and wait for the shelling to end,” one Ukrainian commander told The Times. “Some people get mentally damaged because of such shelling. They are found to be psychologically not ready for whatever they encounter.”

As uncertain as the future may be in Ukraine, the present is clearly dire, as Haines acknowledged when outlining the three scenarios last week. “In short,” she said, “the picture remains pretty grim.”

Related commentary: “The best way to prevent the next war is to defeat him in this one,” The Economist magazine writes, referring to Putin.

#### US arms are key to Ukraine winning

Eric Schmitt & John Ismay 7/1, New York Times reporters. "Advanced U.S. Arms Make a Mark in Ukraine War, Officials Say" <https://www.nytimes.com/2022/07/01/us/politics/himars-weapons-ukraine.html> //pipk

The most advanced weapons that the United States has so far supplied Ukraine are making an impact in their first several days on the battlefield, destroying Russian ammunition depots and command centers, American and Ukrainian officials say.

Ukraine’s military had eagerly awaited the arrival of the first batch of truck-mounted, multiple-rocket launchers, whose satellite-guided rockets have a range of more than 40 miles, greater than anything Ukraine had possessed. The weapons have even won grudging respect from some Russians for their accuracy and power, analysts said.

Still, only four of the launchers, called High Mobility Artillery Rocket Systems or HIMARS, and their U.S.-trained crews are in the fight, though four more are expected this month. Ukrainian officials say they need as many as 300 multiple-rocket launchers to combat Russia, which is firing several times as many rounds as Ukraine’s forces in the artillery-driven war of attrition in the country’s east.

Ukrainian soldiers are using their new weapon judiciously, firing one or two guided rockets at ammunition depots or command posts, often at night, and keeping them well away from the front lines to protect them, Pentagon officials and military analysts say.

“So far they seem to be a quite useful addition,” Rob Lee, a Russian military specialist at the Foreign Policy Research Institute in Philadelphia and a former U.S. Marine officer, said of the systems. “They will help hinder further Russian advances, but they won’t necessarily mean Ukraine will be able to take back territory.”

The HIMARS are the centerpiece of a raft of new Western long-range weapons that the outgunned Ukrainian military is switching over to as its arsenal of Soviet-era howitzer and rocket ammunition dwindles.

The Western weapons are more accurate and highly mobile, but it takes weeks to deploy them from the United States and Europe and to train soldiers to use them. In the meantime, Russia’s military is making slow but methodical gains in the eastern region of Donbas, where both sides have taken heavy losses.

The Biden administration says that all eight HIMARS should be in Ukraine by mid-July. The first group of 60 Ukrainian soldiers trained to use them are now firing the guided rockets in battle, and a second group is undergoing training in Germany. Britain and Germany have each pledged three similar multiple-rocket launchers.

A Ukrainian soldier walks through the debris from an airstrike in the eastern Donbas region. Since Russia refocused its campaign on the east, Ukrainian officials have pleaded with the U.S. and other allies for more advanced artillery.

A Ukrainian soldier walks through the debris from an airstrike in the eastern Donbas region. Since Russia refocused its campaign on the east, Ukrainian officials have pleaded with the U.S. and other allies for more advanced artillery.Credit...Lynsey Addario for The New York Times

A senior Pentagon official said this week that the Ukrainians appear to be employing the HIMARS with deadly effectiveness and that the four additional systems would be deployed in “the near future.”

At a NATO summit in Madrid on Thursday, President Biden promised $800 million more in security assistance to Ukraine, including more ammunition for the HIMARS. The United States has committed nearly $7 billion in military aid since the war started in February.

Since Russia focused its campaign on the east after failing to seize Kyiv, Ukraine’s capital, and other cities in the north, Ukrainian officials have pleaded with the United States and other allies for more advanced artillery.

On June 23, Ukraine’s defense minister, Oleksiy Reznikov, announced that the first American HIMARS had arrived, promising in a Twitter message, “Summer will be hot for russian occupiers. And the last one for some of them.”

Two days later, Gen. Valeriy Zaluzhnyi, the top commander of Ukrainian forces, posted a video on the social media site Telegram of the HIMARS in use. “Artillerymen of the Armed Forces of Ukraine skillfully hit certain targets — the enemyʼs military facilities on our Ukrainian territory,” he said.

American officials said the Ukrainian statements were accurate, and Mr. Lee added that even Russian accounts acknowledged the HIMARS to be early successes.

“In general, it seems they respect them and realize they’re quite capable,” said Mr. Lee, citing a popular Russian Telegram channel whose posts are shared by Russian defense accounts.

At G20 summit, Beijing’s support for Russia will likely be focus of a meeting between U.S. and China.

Zelensky calls Johnson ‘a true friend’ to Ukraine.

U.S. senators in Kyiv say they will push to send more arms to Ukraine.

There is still a debate as to how many multiple-rocket launchers Ukraine needs.

Mykhailo Podolyak, an adviser to President Volodymyr Zelensky of Ukraine, said in June that Ukraine needed 300 multiple-launch rocket systems and 500 tanks, among other things, to achieve battlefield parity — several times as much heavy weaponry as has been promised.

Michael G. Vickers, the Pentagon’s former top civilian official for counterinsurgency strategy, said the Ukrainians needed at least 60, and perhaps as many as 100, HIMARS or other multiple-launch rocket systems to win the artillery battle.

“There are plenty available that could be supplied at minimal strategic risk,” said Mr. Vickers, who was the principal C.I.A. strategist for arming anti-Soviet forces in Afghanistan in the mid-1980s.

Mr. Lee noted that future success of the HIMARS and other multiple-rocket launchers depended not only on the number sent, but also on how much and what type of ammunition the United States and other allies provided.

The transition to American-made rocket weapons was forced in part by the supply problems the Ukrainian army has faced.

Ukraine has three types of Russian-made mobile rocket launchers, but ammunition for only the one with the shortest range is produced by its allies. Ammunition for Ukraine’s longer-range artillery rockets is made solely by Russia and Belarus.

For the HIMARS, Ukrainian forces rely on a guided rocket that is aided by GPS signals and accurate to within about 30 feet of its intended target. Before launch, a three-person crew inputs coordinates for each strike.

After a NATO meeting in Brussels on June 15, Defense Secretary Lloyd J. Austin III said that the guided rockets, fired by both the new American-provided launchers that can carry one pack of six rockets and the launchers from Britain and Germany that can carry twice that, were far more capable than Russian-made artillery rocket weapons that have been used on the battlefield.

“These are precision munitions, and with a properly trained crew they will hit what they’re aiming at,” Mr. Austin said. “Over time, we think the combination of what the allies and partners can bring to the table, it will make a difference.”

Besides firing long-range guided munitions, the wheeled HIMARS trucks have the advantage of speed. Not only can they drive quickly to a firing point, they can program targets while en route, launch their rockets singly or in a ripple of all six within a minute, and reload far faster than anything in use by the Russians.

With 200 pounds of high explosives in each rocket, a HIMARS salvo can rival the devastating effect of an airstrike from a jet loaded with precision-guided bombs.

Following Mr. Austin’s remarks at NATO, Gen. Mark A. Milley, chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, hinted at the effect HIMARS could have in Ukrainian hands.

“If they use the weapon properly,” General Milley said, “they ought to be able to take out a significant amount of targets.”

### Agent Link---2NC

#### Only fiating one agency results in stove-piped implementation that hurts partnerships necessary for security cooperation

Bilal Y. Saab 19, Senior Fellow and Director of the Defense and Security Program. In addition, he is an Adjunct Assistant Professor at Georgetown University’s Security Studies Program in the School of Foreign Service. Saab served as Senior Advisor for Security Cooperation (SC) in the Pentagon’s Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy, with oversight responsibilities for U.S. Central Command (CENTCOM). In his capacity as the Department of Defense’s lead on security cooperation in the broader Middle East, Saab supported the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy’s responsibility for SC oversight by leading prioritization and strategic integration of SC resources and activities for the USCENTCOM Area of Responsibility. "Broken Partnerships: Can Washington Get Security Cooperation Right?" October 11. https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/0163660X.2019.1663120 //pipk

It is convenient, and in many cases justifiable, to assign blame to US partners for the deficiencies of security cooperation, including their hesitancy to take on more responsibilities and their failure to spend more on defense to improve military capabilities. But the unpopular truth is that a major ailment of security cooperation is internal to the United States. This sizeable and exponentially growing enterprise is malfunctioning because the US national security bureaucracy has been in great disorder since the end of the Cold War. If foreign policy starts at home, so does security cooperation.

The key actors involved in security cooperation—the White House, Congress, Department of Defense, and Department of State—do not have a unified understanding of security cooperation: what it’s supposed to achieve, how to use and improve it, and how to tell if it’s working. Moreover, they have failed to coordinate their efforts on various matters including oversight and accountability. Security cooperation relies on bureaucratic partnerships. Yet, these partnerships are broken, and the enterprise is awfully stove-piped as a result of anemic leadership.

### DOS Link---2NC

#### State Department magnifies the link. Forces a trade-off with other priorities and generates jurisdictional conflicts with Defense

Albert Zaccor 5, Colonel, US Army, Atlantic Council Senior Fellow. Director for Southern Europe in the Office of the Secretary of Defense, International Security Policy – NATO/Europe. "Security Cooperation and Non-State Threats: A Call for an Integrated Strategy" August. <https://www.files.ethz.ch/isn/46290/2005_08_Security_Cooperation_and_Non-State_Threats.pdf> //pipk

Moreover, executive branch departments and agencies lack a common set of regional and country-specific Security Cooperation objectives and do not operate according to the same set of priorities. For example, State and Defense are two of the most significant players in Security Cooperation. DOS controls Security Assistance -- including Foreign Military Financing (FMF) and the International Military Education and Training (IMET) program, the largest sources of funds DOD uses to execute its Security Cooperation activities. DOS requests funds from Congress and allocates resources to DOD based on its own assessment of foreign policy requirements, which do not always agree with DOD’s. OSD carefully lays out the strategic rationale for its Security Cooperation plans in its Security Cooperation guidance, but DOS officials are free to ignore or accept the contents of this guidance as they like.119 Likewise, DOD and its subordinate organizations painstakingly prioritize countries and regions to guide allocation of Security Cooperation resources, but the Department of State has its own priorities, which do not always coincide.120

The lack of baseline strategic guidance to govern the planning, programming, and execution of Security Cooperation activities has resulted in the classic failures of an “administered policy.” According to Barry Posen, administered policies prevail in democracies as political leaders trade off initiatives that might be effective in one area against costs measured in terms of other agendas, values, and policies.121 The result is bureaucratic politics and competition for resources and policy attention. To avoid the pitfalls of an administered policy the USG must develop a combined approach that brings together all the stakeholders, assigns responsibilities, and requires integrated planning.122 A document or set of documents, under the signature of the President or the National Security Council will be required to provide sufficient authority to require and compel interagency cooperation in crafting and implementing integrated Security Cooperation strategies.

#### Jurisdictional conflicts independently take out solvency

Matthew E Dunham 15, Major, USAF. He holds a Bachelors of Arts degree in Political Science from Messiah College; a Juris Doctor from The Pennsylvania State University, Dickinson School of Law; and an Masters of Law in International and Operational Law from The Army Judge Advocate General’s Legal Center and School. Worked for the Office of Military Cooperation in Kuwait. 1. ARTICLE: A MOST "IRREGULAR" ASSIGNMENT: A VIEW INTO THE INNER WORKINGS OF A SECURITY COOPERATION ORGANIZATION, 42 The Reporter 34 NEXIS //pipk

Another challenge is working with interagency partners. Being able to work with other agencies, especially [\*37] Department of State Foreign Service officers, is paramount to success. Dr. Catherine Sweet, currently the Political/Economic Counselor at the U.S. Embassy in Abu Dhabi, is a career diplomat and has been posted at a variety of locations with a large military presence. She notes that in as much as SCO personnel have to cope with cultural differences in adapting to the host nation, they must also adjust to the very different institutional cultures within various U.S. government agencies. 7

According to Dr. Sweet, SCO personnel are most effective when they keep the mission's overall strategic objectives at the forefront, recognizing that each agency brings its own strengths (and blind spots) to the table. Once identified, these strengths can be amplified -- and relative weaknesses mitigated -- by working together as a cohesive team in service of the mission's goals. 8 This is, in effect, the interagency version of the DoD's "one team, one mission" principle. On the other hand, interagency squabbling and turf wars can hinder the ability to accomplish the greater U.S. mission in the host nation. When there is cohesion, working with DoS can be one the most rewarding parts of working at a SCO, both personally and professionally -- something Dr. Sweet states is also true for State Department personnel working with DoD. 9

### Non-DSCA Link---2NC

#### Doing the plan outside the DSCA magnifies the link, creates confusion over authority and conflicts with host countries---independently collapses relationships

Matthew E Dunham 15, Major, USAF. He holds a Bachelors of Arts degree in Political Science from Messiah College; a Juris Doctor from The Pennsylvania State University, Dickinson School of Law; and an Masters of Law in International and Operational Law from The Army Judge Advocate General’s Legal Center and School. Worked for the Office of Military Cooperation in Kuwait. 1. ARTICLE: A MOST "IRREGULAR" ASSIGNMENT: A VIEW INTO THE INNER WORKINGS OF A SECURITY COOPERATION ORGANIZATION, 42 The Reporter 34 NEXIS //pipk

It is up to the SCO to understand the DoD components' positions and true needs, comprehend the host nation position, communicate with all parties involved and facilitate resolution. To do this, it is essential for the SCO to have a full sight picture of all DoD happenings in the host nation. Only then can the SCO effectively liaise with the host nation and advise the Ambassador and GCC. A solution to complex multi-component challenges is usually workable as long as the parties have a strong working relationship and communication is open, regular and honest.

This is important not only for solving immediate issues, but for preserving host nation good will for long term strategic interests. Consider, for example, how the above scenario could degenerate into crisis if the Army, Air Force and Navy were independently engaging the host nation (i.e., not coordinating with the SCO), and at one of those engagements, a host nation official was seriously offended. Not only would the SCO lack situational awareness, so would the Ambassador and the GCC, and depending on the gravity of the situation and host nation's reaction, such an instance could seriously jeopardize greater U.S. strategy.

### Yes DSCA---2NC

#### The plan is carried out by Security Cooperation Organization’s under the Chief of Mission and overseen by the DSCA

Matthew E Dunham 15, Major, USAF. He holds a Bachelors of Arts degree in Political Science from Messiah College; a Juris Doctor from The Pennsylvania State University, Dickinson School of Law; and an Masters of Law in International and Operational Law from The Army Judge Advocate General’s Legal Center and School. Worked for the Office of Military Cooperation in Kuwait. 1. ARTICLE: A MOST "IRREGULAR" ASSIGNMENT: A VIEW INTO THE INNER WORKINGS OF A SECURITY COOPERATION ORGANIZATION, 42 The Reporter 34 NEXIS //pipk

"Office of Military Cooperation" is only one term for a Security Cooperation Organization (SCO). A SCO is a DoD organization permanently located in a foreign country with responsibilities for carrying out all security cooperation management functions with the host nation. 1 Depending on political sensitivities within a host nation, a SCO may be known by any number of names, including Office of Defense Cooperation or Military Liaison Office. [\*35] Security cooperation encompasses all DoD interactions with foreign defense establishments to build defense relationships that promote specific U.S. security interests, develop allied and friendly military capabilities for self-defense and multinational operations, and provide U.S. forces with peacetime and contingency access to a host nation." 2 Put another way, "[security cooperation] is the means by which DoD encourages and enables countries and organizations to work with the United States to achieve strategic objectives." 3

A significant portion of a SCO's responsibilities include managing and executing security assistance programs under the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, as amended, and the Arms Export Control Act of 1976, as amended. While the Department of State (DoS) has primary responsibility for implementing security assistance, many programs are executed by the DoD, including Foreign Military Sales, Foreign Military Financing and International Military Education and Training.

Security cooperation, however, is not limited to security assistance, nor is security assistance a SCO's only responsibility. As the principal DoD link to the host nation defense establishment, a SCO is responsible for coordinating various activities such as military exercises, basing and storage of DoD personnel and assets, information sharing, intelligence cooperation, logistical support arrangements, and transit of military aircraft and personnel through the host nation.

A SCO is usually located at or near the U.S. Embassy in the host nation and is headed by the Senior Defense Official/Defense Attaché (SDO/DATT). The SDO/ DATT serves under the direction of the Ambassador, also known as the Chief of Mission, with joint oversight by the respective Geographic Combatant Commander (GCC); the Director, Defense Security Cooperation Agency; and the Director, Defense Intelligence Agency. 4 The SDO/DATT is a member of the Embassy's Country Team and is the Ambassador's principal advisor on defense issues, including planning, coordinating and supporting U.S. defense activities in the host nation. 5 In addition, the SDO/DATT liaises with host-nation defense establishments and represents the Secretary of Defense, GCC, and the DoD Components to host-nation counterparts and other foreign diplomats accredited to the host nation. 6 In these various roles, the SDO/DATT is responsible for selling U.S. military equipment to the host nation, helping the host nation defense forces obtain military education and training, and building and maintaining the U.S.-host nation defense relationship to secure U.S. present and future interests.

#### Yes, all security cooperation involves some coordination through the DSCA

Colonel Luisa Santiago et al 19, Captain Harry Parent, Captain Reed Lorch, Major Deidre Baker, Lieutenant Colonel Timothy Litka, Colonel Luisa Santiago, U.S. Army Reserve Command staff judge advocate; Colonel Anthony Adolph, General Counsel (Staff Judge Advocate) - United States Forces Korea; and Colonel William Smoot, Chief, Criminal Law Division, U.S. Army OTJAG. FEATURE: No. 3 Fostering Enduring Partnerships: An Overview of Security Cooperation Offices Through the Lens of Iraq, 2019 Army Law. 49, Nexis //pipk

The Director of the DSCA, in coordination with the Combatant Commanders (CCDRs) and the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, has approval authority for establishing SCOs and for making staffing changes. 24 Security Cooperation Offices operate in foreign countries under the authority of the Chief of Mission (CoM). 25 The CoM, under the direction of the President, has full responsibility for the direction, coordination, and supervision of all U.S. Government executive branch employees in that country; shall ensure all such employees comply fully with all applicable directives of the CoM; and shall keep fully and currently informed with respect to all activities and operations of the U.S. Government within that country.

Any executive branch agency with employees in the country has a reciprocal duty to keep the CoM informed. 26 An exception is employees under the command of a U.S. area military commander. 27 However, as discussed below, CoMs exercise considerable authority over SCO personnel, to include Title 10 DoD employees. Chiefs of Mission also have, as a principal duty, the promotion of U.S. goods and services for export to such country. 28 Given this statutory framework, the Title 10 DoD security cooperation and Title 22 DoS security assistance missions are clearly linked, and a key role of DSCA, through SCOs, is to help ensure a synchronicity of effort between DoS and DoD on security assistance and cooperation efforts.

### Turns Russia---2NC

#### European security cooperation is set at a fix amount but has shifted to the EDI to deter Russia

Michael J. Mazarr et al 22, senior political scientist at the RAND Corporation. "Security Cooperation in a Strategic Competition" Research Report. <http://www.rand.org/t/RRA650-1> //pipk

Security Cooperation Efforts in Europe Emphasize Reassuring U.S. Allies European partners have consistently received approximately 26 percent of all U.S. security aid, but there has been a shift since 2014 in the type of aid these partners have received. Specifically, more attention has been devoted to developing conventional capabilities to deter Russian aggression. Eastern European states that border Russia, particularly Ukraine, received $1.1 billion from 2014 to 2019.18 Georgia, Latvia, Lithuania, and Estonia also received some funding through the European Deterrence Initiative. However, of the billions of dollars designated for the initiative, only a small portion supports building partner capacity. The initiative was designed primarily to support U.S. force presence, infrastructure, and exercises; as a result, DoD does not formally categorize European Deterrence Initiative funding as security aid.19

Over our period of study, U.S. military sales have increased for both highly capable allies and newer North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) partners in Europe. Among the top weapon purchasers, the United Kingdom, Italy, and Germany are purchasing advanced aircraft, unmanned aerial systems, and missiles through the FMS and DCS programs. Poland and Romania are acquiring Patriot air-defense systems, and Slovakia is purchasing F-16 aircraft through FMS.20

The focus of U.S. education and training efforts in Europe has also been on conventional military capabilities funded by FMS. Germany, the Netherlands, Italy, Romania, and Poland are the top recipients of these security cooperation activities.21

Furthermore, U.S.- and NATO-sponsored exercises in Europe are increasing in number and size. These exercises, which focus on improving interoperability for conventional operations, include Saber Guardian (a U.S.-sponsored exercise with 25,000 service members from 22 allied and partner nations) and Trident Juncture (a NATO-sponsored exercise with 50,000 participants from NATO and partner countries).22 NATO arrangements afford the United States a high degree of access in Europe. Of the 51 countries in the EUCOM AOR, 45 have multilateral SOFAs through NATO or the Partnership for Peace program, and there are 126 acquisition and cross-servicing agreements that apply to the region.23 The majority of USAF armament agreements and airmen in personnel exchanges are with European countries, and most personnel exchanges through the USAF’s Military Personnel Exchange Program are with the United Kingdom. Countries in EUCOM’s AOR received $27 million in Overseas Humanitarian, Disaster, and Civic Aid support, divided across several Eastern European states; Ukraine received $4 million, the highest amount.

#### Increases in security cooperation forces EDI trade-offs. That undermines deterrence

Andrew S. Bowne 18, Major, Judge Advocate, USAF. Presently assigned as a Contract and Fiscal Law Professor, The Judge Advocate General's School, United States Army. 1. ARTICLE: DEFENDING THE NEW FULDA GAP: DETERRING RUSSIAN AGGRESSION AGAINST THE BALTIC STATES THROUGH FISCAL LEGISLATION, 226 Mil. L. Rev. 147. Nexis //pipk

C. Provide Specific Lines of Funding for EDI Activities As previously discussed, one of the problems with EDI as a means to achieving the United States' strategic goals in the Baltic States is the lack of clarity in funding activities. This hampers efforts to plan, program, budget, and execute activities that could provide meaningful support to the deterrence effort. 198 Although the DoD submits a line item budget for EDI funding requests, 199 the FY17 NDAA did not provide funding authorizations for ERI activities in distinct line items in the funding tables. 200

Congress should address this omission to ensure the greatest use of EDI funds possible. Unlike EDI, other operations funded by OCO funds, such as the Afghanistan Security Forces Fund (ASFF) and Counter-ISIL Fund, provide specific line item funding authorizations in the Funding [\*188] Tables of the FY17 NDAA. 201 These authorizations provide the commander with clear limits and sources of funding. The ASFF provides a single appropriation with a two-year period of availability to various types of authorized assistance. 202 Accordingly, it is easier to align the authority with the source of funding available for each security cooperation activity.

Using ASFF funding as an example, Congress should simplify the funding authorization for EDI activities and earmark funds within each appropriation. 203 This will ensure greater ease in accounting and planning activities consistent with Congress's intent to deter Russian aggression through support of NATO. Designating a portion of appropriated funds specifically for EDI will avoid competition between other non-ERI authorities that are funded with the same money.

Moreover, separate lines of authority specific to EDI will eliminate confusion as to what authority EUCOM should use when multiple appropriations appear to authorize the use of funds for the same purpose. When there are multiple authorizations to use funds for the same purpose, the agency must elect which appropriation to use. 204 Due to the EDI's line of effort focusing on building capacity of foreign nations' security forces overlapping with security cooperation authorities, 205 there is confusion as to whether EUCOM can use security cooperation funds in addition to EDI funds, or whether one authority is the more specific of the two and must be used exclusively for its purpose. Separate and specific lines of accounting will at least disentangle funds with common purposes. To ensure maximum utility of all the fiscal authorities relevant to defending NATO allies from Russian aggression, Congress should specifically authorize the use of security cooperation appropriations provided for [\*189] DoD-wide use in addition to EDI funds for building capacity of the forces in the Baltic States. 206

#### EDI is key to deterring Russia---allies are expanding their efforts but US support is critical

\*note---ERI and EDI are the same thing

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Founded on 4 April 1949, NATO is an alliance to safeguard freedom and promote stability in the North Atlantic area through collective defense. 23 Originally twelve members, NATO expanded to twenty-eight, with most of the expansion occurring after the fall of the Soviet Union. 24 Despite numerous geopolitical shifts since its [\*153] inception, NATO is still the "cornerstone of transatlantic security cooperation and the guarantor of peace and stability in Europe." 25 Under Article 5 of the North Atlantic Treaty, NATO members are committed to collective self-defense. 26 Thus, an attack against any NATO member is considered an attack on all NATO members, whereby, in the exercise of the right to individual or collective defense under Article 51 of the United Nations Charter, each member will assist the member attacked, including the use of armed force, to "restore and maintain the security of the North Atlantic area." 27

Although Article 5 was not triggered when Russia invaded Crimea because Ukraine is not a NATO member, the prospect of a Russian attack on a NATO member, such as Estonia or Latvia, reinvigorated the concept of collective self-defense under Article 5. This was invoked only once in the Alliance's history after the terrorists attacks on September 11, 2001. 28 At the 2014 Wales Summit, NATO members agreed to respond to Russia and "pledged to stop cuts and increase defense spending to two percent of GDP [Gross Domestic Product] within a decade," leading many NATO allies to reverse years of defense spending cuts. 29 In 2016, spending cuts stopped across Europe and Canada for the first time in years and a three percent increase in defense spending is expected. 30 In addition to a pledge to increase defense spending, NATO set out plans to increase readiness and responsiveness in Eastern Europe, called the Readiness Action Plan (RAP). 31 The United States' role in the RAP became known as Operation Atlantic Resolve; led by the United States European Command (EUCOM). 32 In 2016, both EUCOM and NATO [\*154] significantly expanded their collective efforts to counter Russian aggression by adding deterrence-based measures to the mission of Operation Atlantic Resolve and the RAP. 33 At the Warsaw Summit in July 2016, NATO leaders determined the strategy to respond to Russia's growing Anti-Access/Area Denial (A2/AD) capability in the Baltics was to increase its forward presence in the Baltics significantly. 34 The United States, along with NATO partners Germany, Canada, the United Kingdom, and France, began the largest buildup of forces in Europe since the Cold War, adding an armored brigade combat team (ABCT) supported by air assault forces into seven nations stretching along the eastern flank of NATO from Estonia to Bulgaria in January 2017. 35

The Obama administration demonstrated its intent to shift United States strategy from "reassurance" to "deterrence" as it requested to quadruple the funding for the European Reassurance Initiative (ERI) for Fiscal Year 2017. 36 In pursuit of a capable deterrent force, the United States, in its informal role as military leader in NATO, has delineated five lines of effort: increased rotational presence of air, land, and sea forces; additional bilateral and multilateral exercises and training to improve overall readiness and interoperability; prepositioning of U.S. equipment to enhance rapid response capabilities in Europe; improve infrastructure to increase flexibility and readiness; and build the capacity of allies and partners in Central and Eastern Europe. 37

Despite the renewed emphasis on security within the European contingent of NATO, the United States would face a disproportionate burden within the Alliance, both militarily and financially, if Russia launches an attack across its western border in order to defend what some may consider a minor ally in Estonia or Latvia. 38 Although the Obama administration affirmed the United States' obligation under Article 5 to come to the defense of any NATO member, he stated that the rest of NATO must build its defense capacity to ease the burden on the United States, leading to doubts among European leaders. 39 President Donald Trump is even less reassuring than his predecessor was. He has indicated defense provided by the United States may be [\*156] contingent on a NATO member's own defense spending. 40 Additionally, a "decade of foreign wars, a devastating global financial crisis, mounting public debt, and profound realignments in international political and economic power have inspired calls for fundamental change from the competing extremes of the American political landscape," towards an isolationist strategy. 41 There are indications of bipartisan public support for foreign policy retrenchment as well. According to one poll, fifty-seven percent of Americans think the United States should deal with its own problems, 42 whereas only forty-four percent of the American public would support the use of U.S. troops to defend the Baltic States from a Russian invasion. 43

Nonetheless, the importance of a credible deterrent and swift response to Russian aggression cannot be overstated. If Russia chose to attack a Baltic state, it will not only test the collective self-defense commitment under Article 5, it will test the credibility and durability of the United Nations Charter's prohibition of the use of force in other states. 44 Thus, NATO's response to any future aggression by Russia within the Alliance's territory "has significant implications for both NATO and the Charter." 45 As such, "[t]he United States should treat [the Baltic States] with the same importance as France, Germany and the United Kingdom." 46

Whatever course of action the Trump administration chooses to take vis-à-vis Russian aggression in Eastern Europe, it is clear President Trump will have to lead NATO through this potentially catastrophic situation with Russia while navigating a fiscal maelstrom of overseas defense spending. Setting up a European response to a Russian A2/AD environment in the Baltics 47 will cost billions of dollars in planning, movement of troops and assets, and development of effective offset strategy; 48 the United States must carefully consider any financial assistance it provides. 49

### Taiwan I/L---2NC

#### DSCA key to Taiwan arms sales

Seth Robson 22, Starts and Stripes, April 8. "US approves air-defense upgrade for Taiwan as COVID-19 nixes reported visit by Pelosi" Nexis //pipk

”The United States has approved a $95 million military sale to boost Taiwan's air defenses, as China sends increasing numbers of warplanes near the island democracy.

Details of a contract to support "training, planning, fielding, deployment, operation, maintenance, and sustainment of the Patriot Air Defense System" on Taiwan were released by the Defense Security Cooperation Agency on Tuesday.

Chinese military planes enter Taiwan's air defense identification zone on an almost daily basis, according to data published by Taiwan's Defense Ministry.

In the past few months, 250 Chinese aircraft have entered the island's zone, double the number the same period last year, Japanese broadcaster NHK reported Thursday. An air defense identification zone, which typically extends beyond a nation's airspace, is an area defined by that country to control and identify approaching aircraft.

"This proposed sale serves U.S. national, economic, and security interests by supporting the recipient's continuing efforts to modernize its armed forces and to maintain a credible defensive capability," the Defense Security Cooperation Agency said in its statement.

Raytheon Technologies, which makes the Patriot system, referred questions about the sale to the U.S. and Taiwanese governments.

The Communist Party of China considers Taiwan a renegade province that must ultimately be unified politically with the mainland.

The U.S. continues to help Taiwan maintain sufficient self-defense capabilities, Taiwan's Defense Ministry said in a statement posted on its website following the U.S. announcement.

"This arms sale shows that the United States attaches great importance to [Taiwan's] national defense and security," the statement said. "The two sides will continue to consolidate the security partnership and jointly maintain peace and stability in the Taiwan Strait and the Indo-Pacific region."

China will take "firm and robust measures" to protect its sovereignty and security interests, Chinese Foreign Ministry spokesman Zhao Lijian told reporters while addressing the sale at a press conference Wednesday.

U.S. arms sales to Taiwan "gravely undermine China's sovereignty andâ€‚security interests, and severely harm China-US relations and peace and stability across the Taiwan Strait," he said, according to a transcript of the press conference. "China rejects and deplores this."â€‚

The latest upgrade for Taiwan, which received its first Patriots in 1997, shows America's commitment to helping nations develop defense capabilities, the Alexandria, Va.-based Missile Defense Advocacy Alliance said in a statement Wednesday. The group lobbies for missile defense, deployment and development.

Meanwhile, a reported visit to Taiwan by U.S. House Speaker Nancy Pelosi appears to be postponed. She has tested positive for the coronavirus, her office said in a statement Thursday.

The speaker's deputy communications director, Drew Hammill, tweeted Friday that a congressional delegation to Asia, which Pelosi was to have led, "will be postponed to a later date."

Pelosi had planned to visit the island on Sunday after meeting Japanese Prime Minister Fumio Kishida, according to a Friday report citing unnamed sources by the Fuji News Network.

China would respond with "resolute and forceful measures" if Pelosi were to visit Taiwan, the state-run Global Times newspaper reported Friday.

The last visit to Taiwan by a House speaker was in 1997 by Newt Gingrich, said Norah Huang, director for international relations at the Prospect Foundation, a security and foreign affairs think tank in Taipei.

"Pelosi has a long record of speaking up for democracy and human rights," she told Stars and Stripes in an email Friday. "She helped young activists involved in the 1989 student movement to leave China and advocated support for democracies along the way of her career."

A visit by the speaker to Taiwan would amplify support for democracy and opposition to authoritarian regimes and human rights abusers, Huang said.

This would be especially important "against the backdrop of the acute display of atrocity by Russian armed forces in Ukraine, the crack-down on Hong Kong civilian rights and the growing aggressiveness of [China] in Taiwan Strait," she said.

### Democracy Module---2NC

#### Stream-lined security cooperation is key to security relationships that solve innovation and deterrence necessary to defend democracy

R. Clarke Cooper 21, nonresident senior fellow at the Atlantic Council, former assistant secretary at the US Department of State, a former senior intelligence officer for the US Joint Special Operations Command. December 23. "A multipolar world requires more adaptive US security thinking" <https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/new-atlanticist/a-multipolar-world-requires-more-adaptive-us-security-thinking/> //pipk

While the scale and volume of military interventions by China, Russia, and Iran are reportedly lower now than at the height of Cold War, the increasing risks of disruptive actions by these state actors and their proxies in a multipolar world require deterrence featuring robust technological solutions, which can only emerge from smart, adaptive policy.

The United States and its security partners are awaiting the Biden administration’s Global Posture Review, along with the potential expansion of security cooperation procedures, expanded congressional reviews, and a revision of the Conventional Arms Transfer (CAT) Policy—which would further protract an already lengthy arms-sale process. Meanwhile, dictatorial adversaries of democracy and freedom in Beijing, Moscow, and Tehran are aggressively seeking opportunities for disruption wherever Washington might expand or reduce security cooperation, or simply withdraw its presence. Ready access to low-cost, but effective, commercial technologies render that threat even more potent.

For the United States to remain a leader in this new multipolar world and more effectively plan its global posture, it must snap out of a Cold War-style mindset, cut down on bureaucracy, and refrain from expanding processes that hamstring security cooperation.

The Trump administration made some notable advances to promote innovation and protect US technological advantage through its 2017 National Security Strategy; 2020 National Strategy for Critical and Emerging Technologies, designed to actively promote innovation; and its commitment to revise the US export policy for Unmanned Aerial Systems (UAS). These policies were a good start, but not enough. Now President Joe Biden has an opportunity to bring them to fruition.

To understand the rapid emergence of UAS threats, look no further than the growth of Iran’s military drone program in recent years, which also extends to Iran-backed groups across various regional conflicts. This includes Houthi rebels in Yemen using drones against Saudi Arabia, Hamas deploying them against Israel in the Gaza Strip, and Iraq-based Shia militia using them to attack US troops—likely including the recent drone attack on Al Tanf, a remote US outpost on the Syrian-Jordanian border. Iran’s increasing use of this technology, specifically “suicide” or “kamikaze” drones that fly into their targets and explode, requires integrated air defenses and Counter-Unmanned Aircraft Systems (C-UAS) technology. Regional US partners in the Middle East, which have increasing requirements to deter Iranian aggression, will seek every opportunity to acquire it from the US government.

The US security establishment has long acknowledged that adversaries like China and Iran are pursuing commercial, off-the-shelf technologies that can threaten US personnel, penetrate allies’ and partners’ air defenses, and generally challenge regional stability. But the US approach still has room for improvement.

As part of its new CAT policy, the Biden administration is considering expanding bureaucratic processes for arms sales to better safeguard US interests—but this inadvertently chips away at the prime placement of American aerospace and defense industries in the global marketplace. Extending the processes for military arms sales and transfers risks ceding the security cooperation space to US adversaries. The United States has a unique role in the world, and its national-security interests—including its defense industrial base—shouldn’t be compromised (certainly not by the government) in pursuit of a “level playing field,” as recently advocated by Assistant Secretary of State for Political-Military Affairs Jessica Lewis. For the US government to suggest putting US industry on par with competitors is counterintuitive; it is a national- and economic- security imperative for the government to bolster US industry to excel with every possible advantage.

US security cooperation historically encompasses facilitating arms sales, staging military training and exercises, developing interoperability among allies and partners, and bolstering the sovereign defense capabilities of security partners. All these efforts need to continue at a deliberate pace—but in a post-Cold War world, the United States no longer has a monopoly on arms sales with an overt technological advantage in all areas.

In recent years, intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance capabilities became the focus of Chinese UAS production, and as then Chairman of the Joints Chiefs of Staff Joe Dunford noted in 2018, “Whoever has the competitive advantage in artificial intelligence and can field systems informed by artificial intelligence, could very well have an overall competitive advantage.” Many of us in the national-security enterprise at the time were also concerned with how AI innovation would shape the development of drones and integrated air-defense systems. With that technological competition heating up, allies and partners matter more than ever.

To remain the “partner of choice” for its allies and partners, the United States needs to work closer with them in collaborative partnerships, such as the trilateral AUKUS defense pact among the United States, Australia, and the United Kingdom. It can also develop other proactive collaborative schemes in emerging technologies to enhance shared capabilities and interoperability, help security partners successfully meet updated UAS export policy, and aggressively advocate for and develop integrated air-defense capabilities.

For the sake of American interests, the US government must carefully foster its partnerships and spark a level of defense innovation to keep the United States and its partners truly secure.

#### Democracy solves multiple extinction risks

Carla Zoe Cremer & Luke Kemp 21, The Future of Humanity Institute, Oxford. Centre for the Study of Existential Risk, Cambridge. "Democratising Risk: In Search of a Methodology to Study Existential Risk" <https://arxiv.org/ftp/arxiv/papers/2201/2201.11214.pdf> //pipk

There is an intimate and neglected relationship between existential risk and democracy. Democracy must be central to efforts to prevent and mitigate catastrophic risks. It is also an antidote to many of the problems manifest in the TUA. Do those who study the future of humanity have good grounds to ignore the visions, desires, and values of the very people whose future they are trying to protect? Choosing which risks to take must be a democratic endeavour.

We understand democracy here in accordance with Landemore as the rule of the cognitively diverse many who are entitled to equal decision-making power and partake in a democratic procedure that includes both a deliberative element and one of preference aggregation (such as majority voting)45,115. Decision-making procedures are not either democratic or non- democratic, but instead lie on a spectrum. They can be more or less democratic, inclusive, and diverse.

We posit three reasons for why we should democratise research and decision-making in existential risk: the nature of collective decision-making about human futures, the superiority of democratic reason, and democratic fail-safe mechanisms.

Avoiding human extinction, or crafting a desirable long-term future, is a communal project. Scholars of existential risk who take an interest in the future of Homo sapiens are choosing to consider the species in its entirety. If certain views are excluded, the arguments for doing so must be compelling.

Democracy will improve our judgments in both the governance and the study of existential risks. Asking how our actions today influence the long-term future is one of the most difficult intellectual tasks to unravel, and if there is a right path, democratic procedures will have the best shot at finding it. Hong and Page116,117 demonstrate both theoretically and computationally that a diverse group of problem-solving agents will show greater accuracy than a less diverse group, even if the individual members of the diverse group were each less accurate. Accuracy gains from diversity trump gains from improving individual accuracy. Landemore115, builds on this work to advance a probabilistic argument that inclusive democracies will, in expectation, make epistemically superior choices to oligarchies or even the wise few. This is supported by promising results in inclusive, deliberative democratic experiments from around the world 118. In the long run, democracies should commit fewer mistakes than alternative decision-making procedures. If this is true, it should improve the accuracy of research efforts and decision-making. We are more likely to make accurate predictions about the mechanisms of extinction, probable futures, and risk prevention if the field invites cognitive diversity, builds flat institutional structures, and avoids conflicts of interest.

Thereare many ways to consider the interests of the many. Democratic assemblies could allow global citizens to deliberate about the futures they prefer, citizens could be surveyed, and the field of ERS itself could be diversified. At the moment, the field is, as many academic disciplines are, unrepresentative of humanity at large and variably homogenous in respect to income, class, ideology, age, ethnicity, gender, nationality, religion, and professional background. The latter issue is particularly true of existential risk, which, despite being an inherently interdisciplinary endeavour, is at the highest levels dominated by analytic moral philosophers. We need to be vigilant to what perspectives are not represented in the study of existential risk. An awareness of bias will go some way towards mitigating its negative effects. To get close to replicating the cognitive diversity found among humans, we must begin by inviting different thinkers with different values and beliefs into the field.

Democracies can limit harms. Any approach to mitigating existential threats could create response risks, and the TUA seems particularly vulnerable to this. Despite good intentions and curiosity-driven research, it could justify violence, dangerous technological developments, or drastically constrain freedom in favour of (perceived) security. If we hope to explore ideas but minimise harms, democracies can be used to moderate the measures taken in response to harmful ideas. It seems, for example, vanishingly unlikely that a diverse group of thinkers or even ordinary citizens would entertain the idea of sacrificing 1 billion living, breathing beings for an infinitesimal improvement in reaching an intergalactic techno-utopia. In contrast, the TUA could recommend this trade-off.

The democratic constraint of extreme measures may simply be a form of collective selfinterest. Voters are unlikely to tolerate global catastrophic risks (GCRs), which incur the death of a sizeable portion of the electorate, if they know they themselves could be affected. We expect that scholars who do not support sacrificing current lives in the name of abstract calculations, but would still like to explore the use of expected value theory in existential risk, will be in support of democratic fail-safe mechanisms.

Empirically, this fail-safe mechanism seems to work. Even deeply imperfect democracies, like the ones we inhabit now, often avert detrimental outcomes. Democracies prevent famines 119 (although not malnutrition)120. They make war — a significant driver of GCRs — less likely 121. The inclusion of diverse preferences in democracies, such as those achieved through women’s suffrage, further decreases the likelihood of violent conflict 122. Citizens often show a significant risk aversion in comparison to their government. While surveys are notoriously difficult to collect and interpret, existing data suggest that the public has little support for nuclear weapons use 123–125, but strong support for action against climate catastrophe 126–128. We can further show that when citizens deliberately engage with the subject at hand, their concern and readiness for action often increases 118. For example, citizen assemblies on climate change have recommended widespread policy-changes across sectors, amendments to incentive structures and laws against ecocide to reach emissions targets 129. Indeed, many lament that when it comes to genetically modified organisms and nuclear power, citizens are far too riskaverse130 . The problem is not that the public is riddled with cognitive biases that make them unconcerned about global catastrophes.

Democratic debate cannot be an afterthought. Navigating humanity through crises will involve many value-laden decisions under deep uncertainty. Democratic procedures can deal with such hard choices. Greater cognitive diversity should be represented amongst scholars of ERS. Recommendations on policies that would reduce risk should be passed through deliberative assemblies and await the approval of a wider pool of ordinary citizens, as they will be the ones who will bear this risk. A homogenous group of experts attempting to directly influence powerful decision-makers is not a fair or safe way of traversing the precipice.

### ---Delays I/L---2NC

#### Delays encourage allies to shift to China and Russia

E. John Teichert 22, Brigadier General, assistant deputy undersecretary of the Air Force for international affairs. "The Power of Proper Security Cooperation" March 15. <https://warontherocks.com/2022/03/the-power-of-proper-security-cooperation/> //pipk

The United States aims to be the security cooperation partner of choice, but competitors get a vote. Chinese and Russian security cooperation activities span the globe, looking to gain access and influence, and often to supplant America’s positions. These competitors are active suitors with a broad portfolio of offerings to potential partners, and America’s missteps cede ground to Beijing and Moscow. As a result, key elements of American security cooperation ought to take this competitive environment into account to seize strengths and opportunities while stiff-arming weaknesses and constraints. With eyes around the world fixed on Eastern Europe, one oft-discussed topic is America’s record of security cooperation with Ukraine since 2014. But some of the most important lessons about U.S. security cooperation might come from another country: Iraq. My experience leading security cooperation efforts in Iraq offers a useful case study from which policymakers and practitioners can draw lessons for U.S. efforts elsewhere in the world.

When allies and partners consider America as a security cooperation partner, their leaders take a variety of factors into account, but foremost among these are quality, cost, and schedule. In general, American security cooperation activities provide quality weapons systems at a reasonable cost, but delivery schedules tend to lag, frustrating partners and empowering competitors. In order to meet American needs, security cooperation ought to be more timely, sustainable, consistent, and holistic.

As the senior defense official and defense attaché to Iraq during a recent 14-month period, I managed a security cooperation portfolio with the Iraqi Ministry of Defense’s five military services, in addition to programs with the Counter-Terrorism Service, the Kurdish Peshmerga, and the Ministry of Interior’s Border Guard Force. This $20 billion portfolio included programs ranging from long-term support for M1A1 Abrams tanks to pop-up security needs within the International Zone during high-threat conditions. It was an environment rich with examples of strategic competition. There, I learned of the power of properly applied security cooperation programs and the pitfalls of security cooperation missteps. These lessons have only been reinforced in my current position.

Accelerating Capability Delivery

From a quality perspective, the equipment that the United States can offer to a partner nation is often superior (with notable exceptions). A partnership with the United States should be considered a competitive advantage, especially when viewed through a long-term lens in which the U.S military commits to effective and sustainable capabilities known as the total package approach. This approach provides not just the weapon system itself, but a broader package of material and services including training, support equipment, spare parts, publications, lifecycle maintenance, and technical assistance. This stands in sharp contrast to security cooperation deals with competitors that rarely provide more than the initial weapon system as a part of their offerings.

Effective and reliable host nation activity on the ramp or on the range tangibly demonstrates the power of a thriving relationship, and a lack thereof can quickly embitter a partnership. This is notably true in Iraq as foreign-made T-90 tanks, CH-4 drones, T-50 aircraft, and Mi-28 and Mi-35 helicopters languish in an inoperable state while American equipment is largely reliable and operational. While the partner nation has to pay for such quality and longevity, they can at least trust that they are getting what they pay for and can expect to rely upon such systems for decades to come. Thus, cost should be considered neither a competitive advantage nor a competitive disadvantage, although the American total package approach undoubtedly provides an initial sticker shock until the benefits of this method of sustainability are thoroughly explained to a partner.

Timeliness, however, is a different story.

American security cooperation faces a notable competitive disadvantage in meeting the desired schedules of partner nations. The Title 22 Foreign Military Sales process, developed to provide a deliberate roadmap towards approval with a slew of checks and balances, often takes years to deliver even simple off-the-shelf capabilities. Meanwhile, strategic competitors offer quick-turn solutions to immediate problems that can satisfy demands in countries around the world.

In the case of Iraq, the security cooperation office could expedite the delivery of capabilities when necessary through the unique benefits of access to Title 10, Section 333 resources (known as Authority to Build Capacity) and some influence over the Counter-ISIS Train and Equip Fund that circumvented normal Title 22 processes. Security cooperation offices in most other countries do not enjoy the flexibility that comes with multiple authority and resource options, and are often forced to rely upon slow and methodical Foreign Military Sales processes. In the end, improved responsiveness and shortened delivery timelines are essential to meet an array of partner nation requirements around the world. Strategic competitors are actively trying to exploit this weakness in the American security cooperation portfolio by offering what appear to be immediate solutions.

### ---AUKUS key to Innovation---2NC

#### AUKUS key to emerging tech innovation

Jennifer D.P. Moroney and Alan Tidwell 22, senior political scientist at the RAND Corporation and manages many of RAND's security cooperation–related projects for Department of Defense clients. Professor of the Practice and Director of the Center for Australian, New Zealand and Pacific Studies (CANZPS) at the Georgetown University Walsh School of Foreign Service. "Making AUKUS Work" March 22. <https://www.rand.org/blog/2022/03/making-aukus-work.html> //pipk

Russia's war in Ukraine brings into stark relief the true meaning of revisionist power. It could serve as a catalyst to urgent action in countering both Russian and Chinese revisionism. On September 15, 2021 President Biden announced the creation of AUKUS, a trilateral, experimental arrangement among the United States, Australia, and the United Kingdom focused on defense technology that would deliver nuclear powered submarines to Australia by 2039. The President also made clear that AUKUS would extend beyond cooperation on submarines, and these sentiments have been echoed in Canberra and London.

Even with the ongoing war in Ukraine, Australian Secretary of Defence, Greg Moriarty, is in Washington to discuss ways to get AUKUS moving. AUKUS could open new avenues for cooperative development (co-designing) and production (co-building) of armaments (the P-8, Triton, and Jammer are examples to follow). Given the lag time to 2039, it would likely be important to demonstrate the utility of AUKUS in facilitating a broader defense relationship by laying out a realistic, clear-eyed vision for the trilateral relationship, establishing a framework and plan to manage the work, identify and then address the existing barriers, and ensure that metrics are in place to measure progress. Taking all these steps may help get AUKUS off the ground, which could bring major benefits to the allies.

AUKUS is an example of mini-lateralism, which can be thought of as a complement to—or a substitute for—traditional intergovernmental cooperation. AUKUS isn't a new alliance. It's an additive, focused security partnership that is intended to deepen collaboration on advanced military capabilities and technologies including cyber, artificial intelligence, and quantum concepts. It builds on the Defense Trade Cooperation treaties negotiated by the Bush administration in 2007 and ratified in 2010. AUKUS presents new opportunities, the first and most often mentioned is that it provides Australia with nuclear powered submarine capability. The U.S. has only ever shared nuclear propulsion technology once before, and that was with the United Kingdom. Second, AUKUS aims to promote greater sovereign capability for Australian and British defense industry by providing access to U.S. technology. Third, it is designed to push back against any potential weakening of the alliance bonds by selectively combining defense capability between Australia, United Kingdom, and United States in the face of strategic competition with China and Russia.

AUKUS could not only deliver new submarines for Australia, but it could become the springboard for revolutionizing how the U.S. works with a select group of its most capable allies.

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The promise of AUKUS stems from the bringing together of three capable allies in a grand experiment, with a high-stakes mini-lateral relationship that depends first and foremost upon trust to deliver highly valued capabilities. If effectively implemented, AUKUS would not only deliver new submarines for Australia, but perhaps more importantly, it could become the springboard for revolutionizing how the U.S. works with a select group of its most capable allies through the extraordinary depth of technological development, access to highly classified materials and expanded sharing of intellectual property.

Canberra, London, and Washington have each responded to AUKUS differently. While all are committed at the diplomatic level, Canberra is perhaps the most deeply engaged, investing significant funding and resources to ensure that both the nuclear-powered submarine and advanced capabilities workstreams succeed. As one anonymous Australian official noted, AUKUS has virtually restructured the entirety of their defense and foreign affairs thinking. United Kingdom national security advisor Stephen Lovegrove described AUKUS as “perhaps the most significant capability collaboration anywhere in the world in the past six decades.” AUKUS fits neatly into the UK's Integrated Review, which promotes London's return to the Indo-Pacific. Of the three powers involved, however, the United Kingdom is, at least on the surface, the junior partner. The U.S. sits somewhere in between, broadly keen to make it work, but distracted by countless other major world events, like the ongoing strategic competition with China.

The barriers to AUKUS success are numerous. At the national level, each country has its own political and economic challenges. Australia will face an election sometime between now and the end of May 2022. If the current Morrison government wins re-election, then it's a safe bet that AUKUS will continue along its current path. The opposition Labor party has also indicated support for AUKUS, and Prime Minister Morrison wrote to the Labor leader thanking him for his “bipartisan approach.” Yet, a new government brings with it a new set of priorities, which could have consequences for the early stages of AUKUS's development. The U.S. mid-term elections this year will soon distract Congress, and so the legislative actions necessary to bring AUKUS into being may well have to wait until 2023. The United Kingdom will go to the polls no later than May 2024.

Given its considerable current international challenges, the United States counts AUKUS as only one among many tasks it must undertake. An essential element of AUKUS's success would require Congressional action, including approval for the nuclear agreement under the Atomic Energy Act. Beyond legislative compliance, the bureaucratic infrastructure to implement AUKUS would need to quickly be established. This includes funding and empowering the working groups with deep analytic expertise to hammer out the details of the security pact. The imbalance of interest between the three nations suggests that Australia has the most to lose, and so it will likely invest the greater effort to see that AUKUS succeeds.

What does AUKUS need to be effective?

AUKUS success depends upon the development of a new legislative framework in the U.S., the commitment of organizational resources, empowering the working groups tasked with governing AUKUS, ensuring access to the requisite expertise, the ability to identify and manage barriers to success, and the employment of measurable indicators of success. These are not easy tasks, and each carries some risk.

An unprecedented U.S. legislative framework would include not only information sharing agreements on nuclear propulsion, but also on much broader areas in key sectors. Such a framework could allow for innovation to flourish, particularly as AUKUS looks for opportunities in artificial intelligence, quantum, and other key defense technologies. The role of the private sector, and the complications therein, is an under analyzed aspect to AUKUS. For example, Lockheed Martin was going to provide Australia with the weapons systems for its recently terminated French submarine contract; now the company may well be the supplier of the weapons systems for newly planned Australian nuclear submarine. And yet, just two days after the announcement of AUKUS, BAE and Rolls Royce won the contract to design a new nuclear powered submarine for the UK, which may have implications for Australia's new submarine, and Lockheed, too. The involvement of defense industry will also raise issues regarding commercial data sensitivities and intellectual property issues—both of which should be studied, as they may require additional legislative attention.

AUKUS would need to be adequately resourced to take on these tasks, which would entail a distributed governance framework with shared responsibilities and committed staff and resources, including political and organizational support from Canberra, London, and Washington. In the U.S., for example, the Departments of Defense, State and Energy would have roles to play. It has been assumed that AUKUS is largely focused on the Indo-Pacific, thus drawing interests from U.S. Indo-Pacific Command. That said, given the broad technology interest in AUKUS, it also draws in the Defense Technology Security Agency and Cyber Command. The U.K. would see input from the Cabinet Office, the Ministry of Defence, the Foreign, Commonwealth and Development Office and the Royal Navy. In Canberra the primary interests will be from the Department of Prime Minister and Cabinet, the Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade, the Royal Australian Navy and the Department of Defence. Two Australian cabinet officials have defence portfolios relevant to AUKUS, including the minister for defence as well as the minister for defence industry.

In launching AUKUS, a number of working groups have been established to study and flesh out the cooperative details. In order to be effective, these working groups could be empowered by strong leadership, informed by evidence-based analysis, and encouraged to convene regularly. They could go beyond admiring the problems to identifying solutions. The success of the working groups would also greatly depend on the active and continuous support of senior leadership from all three nations.

AUKUS is likely to shine a bright light on the barriers to collaboration—not only technical, but also bureaucratic, budgetary, cultural, regulatory, political, and strategic.

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More specifically, the AUKUS working groups could have access to the requisite expertise. Senior leaders could also ensure that the working groups have access to experts, practitioners, and program implementers from Australia, the U.S., and the UK who would understand the breadth and depth of the existing barriers and the necessary workarounds. This could be challenging: in the process of developing the cooperative framework, AUKUS is likely to shine a bright light on the many barriers to collaboration—not only technical, but also bureaucratic, budgetary, cultural, regulatory, political, and strategic.

AUKUS could benefit from clear, measurable outcomes for each working group, developed from the outset. For example, successfully meeting working group deliverable dates is an obvious and essential metric, as is consistent maintenance of working group meeting schedules and speed of decision making. Progress in armaments cooperation is another metric, and includes changing processes that facilitate innovation and deepening of cooperation. The ability to resolve key bureaucratic barriers (such as routine overclassification of information) and regulatory challenges (such as technology transfer limitations) would be yet another hurdle to overcome. The three capitals might develop multi-year plans detailing proposed projects, anticipated costs, and timelines for delivery. Success on each of these projects could be reported annually.

The experiment of AUKUS clearly seems to offer significant opportunities for Canberra, London, and Washington. More than a repackaging of existing capabilities, AUKUS reimagines the way in which three capable allies could work together, more closely than ever before, in many respects. The potential success of AUKUS will rely upon the effective management of this mini-lateral arrangement, and each countries' willingness to adopt new policies and make legislative changes to allow for this close collaboration. Making such changes would require strong management, but even more so, it would require the recognition from all parties that such changes are necessary to make progress in addressing common, overriding strategic goals. What happens now will determine whether the U.S., Australia and the UK can compete more effectively against China and Russia, or whether AUKUS becomes an interesting footnote in the story of what could have been.